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ABSTRACT 
Yaraslau Zayats: Schooling, Wages, and the Role of Unobserved Ability in the 
Philippines 
(Under the direction of Thomas Mroz) 
 
The dissertation analyzes the impacts of an individual’s unobserved ability on schooling 
and wages in the context of a developing country using rich data from the Cebu (Philippines) 
Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey. Unlike any previous study, my model allows for 
grade repetition and school reentry after dropping out of school. Both phenomena are 
common in developing countries in general, and in the Philippines in particular. 
Semiparametric approach is used to control for an individual’s unobserved ability. The 
results indicate that children with lower innate ability enter school at a later age and complete 
fewer years of school. They are also more likely to drop out of school at all levels of 
education, but the effect of lower ability diminishes at higher levels of education. A standard 
Mincer-type regression appears to be misspecified. Results strongly suggest presence of 
heterogeneity in the returns to education by an individual’s ability. Rates of return to 
education appear to be nonlinear differing across three educational levels.  
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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary challenge in studying the effect of education on wages is the fact that more 
able individuals choose more education. If an individual’s ability is poorly controlled for by 
the measured variables, it is possible that the more educated individuals would have received 
higher wages even without their additional schooling. In other words, it is difficult to identify 
how much of the observed association between wages and completed schooling is due to the 
causal effect of education and how much is due to unobserved factors. The measured effects 
of schooling on wages, therefore, potentially incorporate the effects of ability on wages, 
giving rise to what is called ability bias in the returns to schooling. Economists have used 
multiple approaches to resolve it. However, it remains one of the most challenging 
identification problems in empirical research. Recently, concerns have been raised in the 
literature regarding the magnitude of the bias, pointing toward the need for more flexible 
estimation techniques and better controls for unobserved ability. While the accumulated 
evidence on the significance of ability bias in the estimated returns to schooling in the United 
States is quite impressive, few studies for developing countries have addressed this issue 
directly.  
My analysis aims to fill that void in the literature. I analyze the impacts of an individual’s 
unobserved ability on schooling and wages in the context of a developing country. Using 
data from the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey, from the Philippines, I try to 
  
answer the following questions that are crucial for public policy in developing countries. Are 
low-ability individuals more likely to drop out of school than people with higher ability? If 
so, what can be done to keep the low-ability dropouts in school longer? More importantly, 
would this additional schooling benefit individuals in the labor market? In other words, do 
we see a significant return to schooling when we look at their wages? Does this return differ 
by an individual’s ability?  
Numerous questions to which this study seeks to find answers are potentially relevant for 
many other developing countries. The Philippines, and the Cebu region in particular, have 
been undergoing a rapid transition from agriculture and low-skill manufacturing to a service 
and technology oriented economy during the last twenty years. This is the type of transition 
that one can expect many other developing countries to go through in the next few decades. 
I use an economic model of schooling, test scores, and wages. I model both school 
attendance and school completion for each school year. I allow for grade repeats and school 
reentry after dropping out of school. Both phenomena are common in the Philippines in 
particular. None of the previous studies addressed the problem of grade repeats and school 
reentry at the individual level. I model cognitive achievement test scores similar to the 
analysis by Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004). The relationships among these sets of 
outcomes provide a semiparametric identification of the unobservable “ability.” The 
inclusion of a key unobserved factor as a determinant of cognitive achievement test scores 
and IQ test scores provides a reason to label the unobserved factor as “ability.” It is important 
to note, however, that “ability” as used in the paper only refers to those unobserved 
characteristics that impact each of the modeled outcomes.  
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The results strongly indicate that children with lower innate ability enter school at a later 
age and complete fewer years of school. They are also more likely to drop out of school at all 
levels of education, but the effect of lower ability diminishes at higher levels of education. A 
standard Mincer-type regression appears to be misspecified for two reasons. First, I find 
significant heterogeneity in the returns to schooling by an individual’s ability. Second, rates 
of return to education appear to be strongly nonlinear.   
The next section discusses the existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and poses 
major questions of interest. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 discusses the results. 
Section 6 highlights a number of important extensions. Section 7 concludes. 
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CHAPTER  II 
LITERATURE  
 
Ability bias represents one of the oldest problems in labor economics. The literature 
dedicated to this issue is voluminous, especially as it affects estimates of the returns to 
schooling. The approaches used in the literature to remove the ability bias can be classified 
into several groups. One approach dates back to Griliches and Mason (1972) and involves the 
use of available measures of ability as proxies for unobserved ability that is rewarded in the 
labor market. Including such measures in the regression should mitigate the endogeneity of 
schooling, but not completely eliminate it as long as the measures of ability are not perfect 
proxies. Empirically, the estimated return to schooling is generally reduced when unobserved 
ability is proxied. One of the recent examples of this approach is the work by Blackburn and 
Neumark (1995), in which ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery) test 
scores from the NLSY data are used as proxies for ability. The model allows for 
measurement error in the test scores by instrumenting the scores with family background 
variables. Endogeneity of schooling and experience is addressed by instrumenting both 
variables with family background characteristics. The results of the study indicate that the 
usual OLS estimates, with proxies for ability omitted, are upward biased by roughly 40%. 
A second approach uses the differences across siblings in levels of schooling and wages, 
relying on the assumption that much of the unobserved ability is common across siblings and 
is consequently differenced out. Based on this assumption, comparing monozygotic twins is 
  
even better since they share identical genetic endowments and potentially are exposed to 
more similar environments than dizygotic twins or siblings in general. The relevant studies 
include Behrman and Taubman (1976), Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Ashenfelter and 
Rouse (1998), and Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999), to name a few. The within-twins 
estimators generally indicate an upward bias in the OLS estimates if ability is ignored, but 
differ significantly in the magnitude of the bias. However, as Griliches (1979) pointed out 
“one has to keep in mind that they [siblings data] are not a panacea and that simple within 
(between brothers or between twins) estimates are not necessarily closer to the ‘truth’”. 
Twenty years later Bound and Solon (1999) and Neumark (1999) emphasize this point and 
argue that between-twins differences in schooling are not random, but are chosen 
endogenously. Moreover, differencing between twins wipes out much of the exogenous 
variation and inevitably exacerbates the measurement error problem (Griliches 1979). 
A third approach exploits natural variation in determinants of schooling decisions, such 
as the interactions between quarter of birth and compulsory schooling laws, to create valid 
instruments for schooling as in Angrist and Krueger (1991, 1992). This approach tends to 
find at best no omitted-ability bias in the estimated returns to schooling.1 Bound, Jaeger, and 
Baker (1995) show, however, that Angrist and Krueger’s estimates may suffer from finite-
sample bias that arises from weak correlation between quarter of birth and schooling. Staiger 
and Stock (1997) reanalyze the 1980 Census sample used by Angrist and Krueger and 
compute a range of asymptotically valid confidence intervals for standard IV and limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates. Their preferred LIML estimates, that 
involve quarter of birth interacted with state of birth and year of birth as instruments, are 
                                                 
1 They either find no significant changes in the estimates or a negative bias in the OLS estimates. A negative 
bias in the OLS estimate would indicate a presence of a measurement error in schooling rather than omitted-
ability bias (omitted-ability bias is expected to have a positive bias in the OLS estimates). 
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above the corresponding two-stage least squares estimates and 50-70 percent higher than the 
OLS estimates. Hence, their results are in a broad agreement with Angrist and Krueger’s 
results. 
Bound and Jaeger (1997) criticized Angrist and Krueger’s findings from another angle. 
They argue that quarter of birth may be correlated with unobserved ability differences. The 
authors examine earlier cohorts of men who were not subject to compulsory schooling and 
find evidence of seasonal patterns. They also discuss relevant sociobiology and 
psychobiology literature that suggest that season of birth is related to family background. If 
children born earlier in the year come from poorer families one might expect them to have 
low schooling and low earnings. They also show that while the association between quarter 
of birth and educational attainment has declined (between cohorts born in the 1920s and 
those born during the 1940s) no similar decline took place for the association between 
quarter of birth and earnings. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) discuss natural experiments in great detail and analyze a 
variety of recently used instruments that are based on natural experiments. The authors point 
out an extraordinary range of estimates across the studies that use instruments based on 
natural experiments. They argue that, in the presence of heterogeneity in returns to schooling, 
instruments identify local average treatment effects (Imbens and Angrist 1994), that is, the 
effects for the group or groups whose behavior is influenced by intervention, and different 
instruments affect different groups of people. Using a very simple model of schooling choice, 
they show that the date-of-birth (as in Angrist and Krueger 1991) and child-gender (as in 
Butcher and Case 1994) instruments identify the returns to schooling for different ability 
groups in the population. A similar concern but from a different perspective is expressed by 
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Card (2001) who suggests that if there is underlying heterogeneity in the returns to schooling 
then IV estimates that are based on supply-side innovations, like compulsory school 
attendance laws or the accessibility of schools, might recover returns to schooling only for a 
subgroup of population, those with relatively high returns to education. Supply-side 
innovations are most likely to affect schooling decisions of those individuals who would 
otherwise have relatively low amount of schooling. If these individuals generally acquire low 
schooling because they face higher-than-average costs of financing schooling and not 
because of lower-than-average returns to schooling, then IV estimators based on supply-side 
innovations will yield the estimates of the return to schooling above the average marginal 
return to schooling in the population. 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) discuss another aspect of ability bias – strong dependence 
between education and ability. They argue that if this dependence becomes too strong, it is 
impossible to isolate the effect of schooling from ability even when the latter is perfectly 
observed. They call this sorting bias, and it is closely related to perfect multicollinearity. The 
authors illustrate this problem through tabulation of completed schooling by ability quartile 
for a sample of white males from the NLSY. It appears that for many schooling-ability pairs 
the cells are either entirely or nearly empty. For example, there are no individuals with 
postgraduate education in the lowest-ability quartile. That makes it difficult to isolate 
separate ability effects and schooling effects. In the limit, if ability and education are 
perfectly stratified, returns to education cannot be isolated from returns to ability. The 
authors use the first principal component of the ASVAB test scores, which supposedly 
represents general intelligence, as the measure of ability to nonparametrically estimate the 
returns to schooling on a sample from the NLSY. The results reveal that education and 
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cognitive ability are so strongly associated that the wage effects of the two cannot be 
separated for all groups.  
Another group of methods involves semiparametric and nonparametric estimation 
techniques for tackling the problem of ability bias. For instance, Belzil and Hansen (2002) 
use a panel of white males from the NLSY and estimate a structural dynamic programming 
model of schooling decisions with unobserved heterogeneity in both school ability and 
market ability, in which the wage regression is estimated using splines. The results cast doubt 
on the validity of the high returns to education reported in the literature. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom (Card 1999), the log wage regression is found to be convex in 
schooling. Namely, the marginal returns to schooling are 1 percent per year or less until 
grade 11, then increase to 3.7 percent in grade 12, and exceed 10 percent only between grade 
14 and 16. The average return, measured from grade 7, increases smoothly from 0.4 percent 
(grade 7) to 4.6 percent (grade 16). A linear wage regression appears to be severely 
misspecified. The analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis of orthogonality between market 
ability and realized schooling and indicates the existence of a positive ability bias. 
Interestingly enough, the correlation between school ability and market ability is found to be 
very high, 0.95. 
Essential to our analysis is the study by Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2004). One 
dimension of the study is a semiparametric model that the authors develop for estimating the 
effect of schooling on achievement test scores. Assuming that a person’s latent ability cannot 
be affected by schooling, the authors test whether manifest ability, as measured by ASVAB 
achievement tests, is affected by schooling when both schooling and manifest ability are 
allowed to be affected by latent ability. The amount of completed schooling is modeled via 
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specifying utility functions for all levels of potential completed schooling (high school 
dropouts, high school graduates, some college, 4-year college graduates). The utility 
functions are linear in exogenous characteristics (family background variables for all choices 
and local labor market characteristics as choice-specific), latent ability and an error term. It is 
assumed that schooling decision is made only once, implying perfect foresight. Once in 
school there are no grade repeats and dropping out of school is an absorbing state. The age 
when child starts school is introduced as a dummy variable (on-time entry vs. late entry) and 
modeled nonparametrically by pairing each schooling choice with the age at entry. This leads 
to an eight school-choice function instead of four. They model test scores as a function of 
exogenous characteristics (family background characteristics and age), schooling, latent 
ability and error term. All error terms are independent of each other and of latent ability. In 
other words, the equations are related only via what they call unobserved innate ability. The 
authors prove nonparametric identification of the distribution of latent ability. The structural 
model is estimated on a sample of white males from the NLSY using Bayesian MCMC as a 
computational tool. The results indicate that the effects of schooling on test scores for a given 
level of ability are approximately linear across schooling levels. One year of schooling 
increases the AFQT score between 2.79 and 4.2 percentage points on average. Also, the 
authors estimate Mincer-type wage equation with OLS-residualized AFQT as the measure of 
unobserved ability to results from the Mincer-type wage regression with the estimated latent 
ability measure. While estimated latent ability measure represents the measure purged of the 
effect of schooling on ability, OLS-residualized AFQT inherently includes the effect of 
schooling on ability. Therefore, one would expect the estimated return to schooling to 
increase when comparing the wage equation with OLS-residualized AFQT to the wage 
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equation with estimated latent ability measure. This is exactly what their results reveal: the 
use of OLS-residualized AFQT yields the estimate of the return equal to 10.22% and the use 
of estimated latent ability measure increases the estimated return by 1.5 percentage points. 
The literature on the returns to schooling and ability bias in the context of developing 
countries deserves a separate discussion. If in the United States a private return to education 
is in the range of 5-12 percent (Burtless 1996), in developing countries this return is found to 
be generally much higher. Psacharopoulos (1994) reports the average private return to 
education in developing countries to be 29 percent for primary education, 18 percent for 
secondary education, and 20 percent for higher education. Even though there has been an 
enormous number of studies that estimate Mincer-type wage equations using data from 
developing countries (see the reviews in Schultz 1988, Strauss and Thomas 1995), very few 
studies have a measure of ability available in the data. Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985), 
Psacharopoulos and Velez (1992), Alderman et al. (1996a), and Glewwe (1996) are the 
notable exceptions. In two of these studies, sample sizes are either less than or barely exceed 
two hundred. All the authors use Raven’s test score (Raven’s Progressive Matrices) as a 
measure of innate ability. Raven’s test scores tend to have little direct effect on wages, but 
considerably affect achievement scores, which in turn significantly affect wages. The effects 
of completed schooling are similar to those of Raven’s tests: schooling’s effect on wages is 
mostly indirect, operating through the cognitive skills as measured by achievement tests. 
It is worth noting, however, that the use of Raven’s tests as a measure of innate ability is 
controversial. The major concern is well expressed by Glewwe and Jacoby (1994, 851), who 
point out that: “This test [the Raven’s abstract thinking test] was never intended as such [as 
an indicator of “innate” ability, independent of schooling]”. In the data they use, there is, 
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conditional on age, a strong positive association between Raven’s scores and years of 
acquired schooling. Their data set is not the only example – in the Pakistani data that 
Alderman et al. (1996a) use, Raven’s test scores are significantly higher for men than for 
women. This difference in Raven’s test scores is potentially related to the fact that men 
acquire more schooling than women in Pakistan, which would imply that Raven’s test scores 
are influenced by schooling. This point is reinforced by the fact that the difference in the 
amount of completed schooling appears to be unrelated to possible differences in innate 
ability between Pakistani men and women – single-sex schools are predominant in Pakistan 
and the girls are disadvantaged in terms of school availability (Alderman et al. 1996b).  
The literature review would be incomplete if I did not mention the research that has been 
done on returns to schooling in the Philippines. Lanzona (1998) analyzes the migration of 
workers in rural communities of the Philippines. The study uses data from the Bicol 
Multipurpose Surveys conducted in 1978, 1983 and 1994. The results indicate that the more 
educated and experienced individuals are more likely to outmigrate, causing a sample 
selection bias in the estimation of returns to schooling. The migration should not be 
surprising, however, given that: 1) the Bicol Multipurpose Surveys cover only one region, 
which happens to be one of the poorest regions in the country2, and 2) during the time period 
that this study covers the Philippines have been undergoing a rapid transition from 
agriculture and low-skill manufacturing to a service and technology oriented economy. 
Schady (2003) uses data from a recent nationwide household survey, the 1998 Annual 
Poverty Indicator Survey, to estimate returns to schooling for Filipino men. The results 
suggest convexity – the returns to both primary and secondary education are lower than those 
                                                 
2 For example, in 1994 it had the highest poverty rate (Lanzona, 1998). 
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for tertiary education. As a result, the returns to primary and secondary education are 
considerably smaller than the conventional rates in the literature. Depending on the 
specification, the mean rate of return ranges from 6.2 to 9.4 percentage points for primary 
education and 6.9-10.0 percent for secondary education (based on Schady 2003, Table 2). 
Schady also finds sheepskin effects in the returns, i.e., within a given level of education, the 
returns to completing the last year of primary school, high school, or college are higher than 
the returns to any year below the last one. Both of these results can be driven by ability bias. 
Data limitations preclude the author from fully exploring such a possibility.3  
In summary, for the last forty years the literature has recognized ability bias as a serious 
econometric problem. Economists used multiple approaches to resolve it. None of them 
provides a universal fix. Recently, concerns have been raised regarding the magnitude of the 
bias, pointing toward the need for more flexible estimation techniques and better controls for 
unobserved ability. While the accumulated evidence on ability bias in the United States is 
quite impressive, few studies for developing countries have addressed this issue directly. 
                                                 
3 His analysis partially controls for ability by including measures of parental education and by using within-
sibling estimates. He finds no significant changes in the results. It is unclear, however, to what extent these 
measures can control for innate ability. 
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CHAPTER  III 
DATA 
 
The data come from the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey (CLHNS). The 
CLHNS follows a representative cohort of Filipino children born between May 1, 1983 and 
April 30, 1984 in 33 randomly chosen barangays4 (17 urban and 16 rural) of the Metropolitan 
Cebu region.5 Metro Cebu is the second largest metro area in the Philippines, with a 
population of 1.4 million (as of the 1990 census). Contrary to the commonly held view that a 
“metro area” is urban by definition, Metro Cebu encompasses vast agricultural areas reaching 
deep into Cebu Island. At the time of the 1980 census, for instance, Metro Cebu included 155 
urban and 88 rural barangays based on the Census Bureau classification (148 urban and 95 
rural barangays based on the reclassification made by the CLHNS researchers). 
Multiple follow-up surveys have been made for the last twenty years, tracking the 
children from their birth up to the present day. The latest surveys are 1991-1992, 1994-1995, 
1998-1999, 2002-2003, and 2005 follow-up surveys, with the latter survey being finished this 
fall. The CLHNS data sets provide detailed, up-to-date information on each child, including 
early childhood development, family background, household, and community characteristics, 
                                                 
4 “Barangay” is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines; it can be thought of as a community or  
district. 
5 First, a single-stage cluster sampling procedure was used to randomly select 33 barangays from the Metro 
Cebu area. Then the barangays, which contained about 28,000 households, were completely surveyed in late 
1982 and again in early 1983 to locate all pregnant women. Women of the selected communities who gave birth 
between May 1, 1983 and April 30, 1984 were included in the sample.  
  
as well as information on the characteristics of schools children attended. As with any 
longitudinal data, the sample attrition across the surveys is of potential concern. My analysis 
hinges on surveys starting from the 1991-1992 survey (the first that provides information on 
schooling). During the 1991-1992 survey 2,260 children were surveyed, and the 2002-2003 
survey (the latest survey with available data) contains information about schooling decisions 
for 2,040 individuals. The attrition appears to be fairly low. Looking across all the surveys, 
most of the attrition happened during early childhood. Out of 3,080 nontwin live births, only 
2,600 households were surveyed during the first two years of children’s lives. The attrition 
was mostly due to death or migration out of Metro Cebu. The actual sample that I use 
includes only those for whom it was feasible to construct complete schooling trajectories 
from the panels. Since the data from the 2005 survey became available only in April 2006 
and not in its entirety (for instance, data for community characteristics has not been 
processed) first part of my analysis will use data only up to the 2002-2003 survey. That 
sample consists of 1982 individuals. When adding the most recent data from the 2005 survey 
the sample size reduces to 1831 individuals. Descriptive statistics of the variables are 
reported below in Tables 1-4. Details on the construction of the variables are provided in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Key Time-Invariant Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Male .5292 .4993 0 1 
Low birth weight .1231 .3262 0 1 
Entered school on time .7674 .4226 0 1 
Math test 30.5621 11.0814 0 58 
English test 27.4187 10.4548 0 59 
IQ test 32.8548 6.6368 5 47 
Mother’s education (log) 1.9795 .4885 0 2.9444 
Father’s education (log) 1.8554 .5598 0 2.8904 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 39.1714 5.1930 22.5 55.6 
Fraction of public schools in the area .9547 .0639 .6988 1 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, about 77 percent of the sample entered school “on time”. 
Parental completed education is relatively low, with the mean of 7.2 years for mothers and 
6.4 for fathers. Class size, as proxied by local pupil-teacher ratio, appears to be relatively 
large, over 39 pupils per teacher, on average. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Key Time-Specific Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Height at 2nd birthday (log) -.2339 .0440 -.4155 -.1109 
Age as of IQ test date 8.6600 .2756 8.1667 9.0833 
Age as of achievement test date 11.7402 .4066 10.8333 12.8333 
Completed schooling as of IQ 
test date 1.3094 .7036 0 3 
Completed schooling as of 
achievement test date 4.0940 1.0400 0 6 
Household income (lagged) 5.4759 .5189 4.5511 9.8669 
Urban (averaged, time of child’s 
2nd birthday and 1991-92 
survey) 
.7356 .4268 0 1 
Population density (log, 
averaged) 8.6589 1.5952 4.5642 11.1956 
Price of kerosene (log, 
averaged) .8725 .3209 -.0594 1.5009 
Price of bananas (log, 
averaged) -1.5713 .1975 -2.4487 -1.0186 
Price of corn (log, averaged) .9167 .1545 .4322 1.1842 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates that achievement tests (Math and English) were administered at the 
time when all of the sample were still in primary school. The non-verbal intelligence (IQ) test 
was administered several years before that when most of the sample had yet very few 
schooling, 1.3 years on average. For that reason the IQ test might be an attractive proxy for 
an individual’s unobserved ability.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Time-Variant Variables 
Variable 1990 Mean (Std. Dev.)
1996 Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
2002 Mean
(Std. Dev.)
2004 Mean
(Std. Dev.)
Household size 6.9511 (2.3427) 
7.1302 
(2.4768) 
6.9119 
(2.7924) 
6.4074 
(2.7205) 
Family business 0.3468 (0.4506) 
0.4425 
(0.4968) 
0.5094 
(0.5000) 
0.4003 
(0.4901) 
Household income (log) 5.9486 (0.5531) 
5.9382 
(0.7642) 
6.2006 
(0.8188) 
5.8784 
(1.0666) 
Household income net of individual’s 
(log) –
6 – 6.1087 (0.8732) 
5.6415 
(1.2248) 
Caretaker’s household 0.9344 (0.2476) 
0.9173 
(0.2756) 
0.8476 
(0.3595) 
0.7488 
(0.4338) 
Age (by the beginning of school year t) 6.6609 (0.2759) 
12.6609 
(0.2759) 
18.6609 
(0.2759) 
20.6591 
(0.2758) 
Completed schooling (by the beginning 
of school year t) 
0.0096 
(0.0975) 
4.9723 
(1.2350) 
8.9945 
(2.5119) 
9.5751 
(2.8671) 
Attended elementary school during the 
year t 
0.9545 
(0.2132) 
0.9066 
(0.2912) 
0.0365 
(0.1879) –
7
Attended high school during the year t – 1.0000
8
(0.0000) 
0.1793 
(0.3838) 
0.0378 
(0.1907) 
Attended college during the year t  – – 0.7757 (0.4175) 
0.4803 
(0.5000) 
Successfully completed the grade, if in 
elementary school that year 
0.8338 
(0.3724) 
0.9394 
(0.2387) 
0.8571
(0.3780) – 
Successfully completed the grade, if in 
high school that year – 
0.8918 
(0.3108) 
0.8021 
(0.3995) 
0.8919 
(0.3148) 
Successfully completed the grade, if in 
college that year  – – 
0.8652 
(0.3419) 
0.9148 
(0.2796) 
Working for pay – – 0.7486 (0.4340) 
0.7969 
(0.4025) 
Working experience (in years)  – – 1.1771 (1.1950) 
3.0983 
(1.5770) 
Log of the hourly wage rate  – – 2.5798 (.9477) 
2.9915 
(.7060) 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor – – 15.6800 (6.9304) –
9
Urban 0.7356 (0.4411) 
0.7306 
(0.4437) 
0.7184 
(0.4499) – 
                                                 
6 This variable (as well as some variables below) is used in modeling “working for pay,” which is modeled  
starting from 1997, and therefore does not have nonmissing observations prior to 1997.  
7 Unless otherwise noted, here and below the variable is missing if it is irrelevant for the year t, e.g., no one was in  
high school in 1990, etc.  
8 1.0 means that all of those who were eligible to go to high school that year (i.e., all who completed elementary  
school by 1997) did go to school during the school year 1997. 
9 As noted in Appendix A, community characteristics for years 2003-2005 were proxied by the data from the 
2002-2003 survey. 
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Table 3 adds another dimension to the analysis of the descriptive statistics. An average 
household size appears to be fairly large throughout the surveys, over 6 people in a 
household. A substantial fraction of the sample is involved in a family business, the number 
ranges from 35% in 1990 to about 50% in 2002.  
The numbers of years of working experience immediately reveal that our sample 
represents young wage workers – with slightly over a year of working experience, on 
average, at the time of the 2002-2003 survey and with slightly more than three years of 
experience at the time of the 2005 survey.  
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Some Time-Variant Variables (all years) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Attended elementary school  11256 0.8523 0.3549 
Attended high school (conditional on 
completion of elementary school) 10618 0.6009 0.4897 
Attended college (conditional on completion of 
high school) 2705 0.7146 0.4517 
Successfully completed the grade, elementary 
school 11400 0.9220 0.2682 
Successfully completed the grade, high school 6380 0.8839 0.3204 
Successfully completed the grade, college  1933 0.8665 0.3402 
 
 
Table 4 along with some variables in Table 3 provides information on school attendance 
and school completion by educational group. At this point it is worth providing more details 
on the educational system in the Philippines. Basic education consists of six years of primary 
school and four years of secondary school; obtaining a university degree normally takes an 
additional four to five years. Under the Philippine Constitution, both primary and secondary 
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education are free in public schools. However, the proportion of secondary schools that are 
public has been considerably smaller, especially in rural areas.10 Also, while primary 
education is mandatory, secondary education is voluntary in the Philippines. 
For the last few decades, the Philippines have gone through a rapid economic 
development. The Cebu region exemplifies that transition. This region has been undergoing a 
transition from agriculture and low-skill manufacturing to a service and technology oriented 
economy, with substantial population growth as well as rapid economic growth. Six of the 
top ten products produced in Cebu are high technology (e.g., semiconductors, electronic 
watches, etc.). This is the type of transition that one can expect many other developing 
countries to experience in the next few decades.  
Such an accelerated economic development in the Philippines has been associated with 
educational expansion. As a result, the Philippines have achieved one of the highest school 
enrollment rates, especially in primary schools, among less developed countries. For 
example, during school year 1990/1991, when most of our sample entered school, the net 
enrollment rate in primary schools was 95.3 percent (1991 Philippine Development Report 
1992). These gains, however, have been offset by low school completion rates. The 
proportion of students enrolled at the beginning grade who reached the final grade of primary 
school at the end of the required number of years of study in year 1990/1991, for instance, 
was 68.2 percent (1991 Philippine Development Report 1992). Dropping out of school and 
grade repetition account for this low rate. About 40 percent of our sample repeated a grade at 
least once. Despite the fact that almost all of the individuals in our sample enrolled in school 
at some point, the proportion of students who reached the final grade of primary school at the 
                                                 
10 In 1997/1998, for instance, public primary schools accounted for 92.3 percent of total primary enrollments, 
while public secondary schools accounted for only 72.0 percent of total secondary school enrollments 
(Behrman, Deolalikar, and Soon 2002). 
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end of the required number of years was only 69.5 percent. Seventeen percent of the sample 
never made it to high school. Of those who went to high school, 26.3 percent did not finish 
by age nineteen.  
This naturally raises several questions. What factors affect youths’ decision to drop out? 
Are individuals with lower innate ability more likely to drop out of school than people with 
higher ability? If so, what can be done to keep the low-ability dropouts in school longer? 
More importantly, would this additional schooling benefit individuals in the labor market? In 
other words, do we see a significant return to schooling when we look at their wages? Does 
this return differ by an individual’s ability? These are some of the questions I seek to answer 
in this work. Knowing these answers should provide important lessons for policymakers in 
many developing countries that will experience similar economic changes over the coming 
decades. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
MODEL 
 
Overview 
The model is developed to answer the questions posed in the previous section. It can be 
divided into three parts, corresponding to school grade progression, test scores, and labor 
market outcomes. All of the outcomes are modeled as functions of unobserved ability. The 
intuition behind modeling innate ability is simple. An individual’s innate ability is never 
observed. Any cognitive test (either achievement or intelligence) is only a proxy for innate 
ability. It is always unclear how good such a proxy is. Generally, test scores are affected by, 
among other factors, the amount of acquired schooling at the time the tests are taken.11 The 
semiparametric approach that I use to control for an individual’s innate ability allows me to 
avoid such problems. This approach is based on the methodology developed by Hansen, 
Heckman, and Mullen (2004). I specify a one-factor model, where an unobserved factor 
enters all outcomes of interest. The inclusion of the unobserved factor as a determinant of 
cognitive achievement test scores and IQ test scores provides a reason to label the 
unobserved factor as “ability.” It is important to note, however, that “unobserved ability” as 
used in the dissertation only refers to the collection of unobserved characteristics that impact 
each of the modeled outcomes. 
                                                 
11 Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004), for example, estimate that one year of schooling increases the AFQT 
score, on average, between 2.79 and 4.2 percentage points. 
  
The only dependence among all outcomes comes from a common unobserved ability. All 
of the equations are estimated simultaneously using full-information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) with Gauss-Hermite quadrature approximation for the unobserved ability, which is 
assumed to follow a standard normal distribution. The normality assumption is relaxed later 
on. Below, the model is outlined in greater detail. 
 
School Grade Progression 
The school grade progression part of the model serves two purposes. First, it helps to 
identify factors that affect an individual’s decision to attend school and to successfully 
complete each year. I model both attendance and successful completion since, despite high 
enrollment rates, as previously noted, we observe substantial dropping out in the Philippines, 
as well as subsequent school reentry, and grade repetition. These phenomena are common in 
developing countries in general; to the best of my knowledge, however, none of the previous 
studies addressed the problem of grade repeats and school reentry at the individual level.  
The second purpose of the school grade progression part is to control for the endogeneity 
of schooling – all of the schooling outcomes are modeled as functions of unobserved ability, 
which reflects the fact that more able individuals, generally, choose to acquire more 
schooling.  
Within each educational level (primary school, secondary school, and tertiary education), 
progression through school grades is modeled by two binary outcomes. They represent the 
decisions and behavior of each individual and his/her family with respect to schooling every 
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year.12 First, a person must decide whether to enroll in school (variable ATTND) and then 
each individual has an opportunity to successfully finish a grade (variable SUCSS). The 
variable SUCSS is modeled if and only if the person attended school that school year, i.e., if 
the variable ATTND is equal to one. SUCSS captures dropping out as well as failing to 
advance to the next grade.  
In terms of economic behavior, each individual maximizes his/her utility subject to the 
budget constraint. The resulting subsequent lifetime indirect utility from attending school 
during school year t is: 
1 ,( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 1t t tt t tV ATTND U ATTND E V ATTNDt εβ +⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦= = = + =  
0t
Lifetime indirect utility from not attending school during school year t is: 
1 ,( 0) ( 0) ( 0)t t tt t tV ATTND U ATTND E V ATTND εβ +⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦= = = + = , 
where ,1tε  and ,0tε  represent preference shocks and are assumed to be independently and
identically distributed as Type I extreme value distribution. It follows that an individual 
decides to enroll in school if and only if the difference in the indirect utilities is greater than 
zero. The latent variable 
 
tATTND
∗  measures this difference in utilities: 
 
,00 t
*
1 ,1 11 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t tt t tATTND U ATTND ATTND U ATTND ATTNDE V E Vε εβ β+ +≡ = = + − = =⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎣ ⎦ ⎣+ − −⎤⎦
 
 
Similar logic applies to the successful completion of the grade, , and all other 
e of 
that decision. The first school entry is modeled as a separate outcome. 
                                                
 tSUCSS
∗
discrete outcomes in this model. For primary school, I model ATTND for each person starting 
with the year after the first school entry, conditional on completed schooling as of the tim
 
12 Since the attendance and completion rates across the three groups are different, there is no need for modeled 
effects to be constant across these groups. I allow the schooling outcome parameters to differ across the three 
educational groups (grades 1-6, grades 7-10, grade 11 and above).  
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I approximate the latent indexes ATTND∗  and UCSS S ∗  as: 
 
, 1 , 1 , 1(1 ) (1 )it ATD i t ATD i t i t ATD i ATD it ATD it ATD it ATD i itATTND ATTND ATTND SUCSS X Z C S fγ φ α β ϕ γ∗ − − − ′ ′ ′= − + − + + + + + +δ ξ
 
, 1 , 1 , 1(1 ) (1 )it SUC i t SUC i t i t SUC i SUC it SUC it SUC it SUC i itSUCSS ATTND ATTND SUCSS X Z C S fγ φ α β ϕ γ∗ − − − ′ ′ ′= − + − + + + + + +  δ ζ
 
 
The terms , 1(1 )ATD i tATTNDγ −−  and , 1 , 1(1 )ATTND SUCSSATD i t i tφ − −−  are included to 
capture costs associated with the decisions to repeat a grade and to reenter school, 
respectively. ATDγ  represents the effect of not attending school the previous school year and 
ATDφ  represents the effect of failing the grade attended during the previous sc ar. T
similar terms are included in SUCSS
hool ye wo 
it
∗  to reflect the fact that successfully completing a grade
might be easier if the person repeats the grade and that successfully completing a grade m
be harder if the person was out of school for some time. The vector 
 
ight 
iX  represents individual 
vector 
characteristics including age, sex, and a low birth weight dummy as a health measure. The 
itZ  consists of family background variables including household income, household 
it
it
size, fam
vector 
ily business dummy, parental education, and caretaker’s household dummy. The 
 includes community characteristics including urban/rural dummy, population 
density, food prices, and school quality characteristics. The variable  represents the 
amount of successfully completed schooling by the beginnin t. The variable 
C
S
g of school year 
if  stands for unobserved ability. The error terms ( itξ  and itζ ) are independent of each other 
and logistically distributed. 
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Entering School on Time 
Initial school entry is modeled as a separate outcome. For simplicity, it is chosen to be a 
binary outcome – on time vs. late entry to school, with “on time” meaning “entered school by 
age 7.5.” Note that “on time” entry controls for the attendance of the first year in school. The 
latent index specification is: 
1 1i N i N it N it N iN X Z C f iα β ϕ θ∗ − −′ ′ ′= + + + +ω , 
where subscript “t-1” stands for using lagged values (from the time the child was 2 years old) 
of the variables. Community variables are constructed as the averages of community 
characteristics from the time the child was 2 years old and 1991-1992 survey. Lagged and 
averaged characteristics are used for two reasons. One is the fact that sending the child to 
school is a complex decision, likely to be affected by the past as well as the present. The 
second reason is to provide additional identification: the variation in the exogenous 
characteristics at the time of the child’s 2nd birthday is different from the present. This is 
crucial since “on time” entry is at the very beginning of school grade progression and 
acquired schooling enters in all subsequent outcomes. Aggregate primary school quality 
characteristics from the 1994-1995 survey are used as a proxy for primary school quality in 
the area at the time the decision is made to send the child to school. Aggregate school quality 
characteristics are constructed by computing averages of school quality characteristics across 
local schools within a certain area using geographical coordinates of schools (for more 
details, see Zayats 2004). 
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Test Scores 
Three cognitive achievement tests (Math, English, Cebuano) were administered during 
the 1994-1995 follow-up survey. For the purpose of our analysis, Math and English test 
scores are used. All children who were surveyed took the tests independent of schooling 
status. Additionally, the Philippines Non-Verbal Intelligence Test (“IQ test” for simplicity) 
developed by Guthrie, Tayag, and Jimenez (1977), was administered in the 1991-1992 and 
1994-1995 surveys. The IQ test is comparable to Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices, 
which are heavily used in empirical research on developing countries as a measure of innate 
ability. I use the IQ test scores from the 1991-1992 survey, since at that time only a fraction 
of the sample was already in school. Test scores are modeled similar to Hansen, Heckman, 
and Mullen (2004), who in their turn extend the factor analysis model used in psychometrics. 
The k th test score is modeled as 
 
, , ,( ) ( )i i ik i k k is f s( )ik k i kT X sβ µ+= ′ (English), 3 (IQ) λ ε+ +                          k = 1 (Math), 2 
 
,k iX  includes all exogenous regressors (individual, parental, community, and school 
characteristics) and is  measures completed education as of the time of the test. ( )ik sµ  is a 
level effect of schooling that is uniform across unobserved ability levels. The effect of 
unobserved ability on test scores can vary by completed schooling at the time of the test, and 
it is given by ( )ik sλ . Both f and ( )s ε are assumed to be independent and have zero . 
( )
means
ik sµ  is further parameterized as ( ) k iik s Sµ α= . A more flexible specification would b
second- or third-degree polynom 2 3
e a 
ial, e.g., 1, 2, 3,k i k i k iS SS α αα + + , but linearity is not very 
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restrictive given that all schooling variation at the time of testing is within primary school
only. ( )ik
 
sλ  is similarly specified as i0, 1,( ) k kik s Sλ ρ ρ= + .  
i i iX S f Wβ β β ε′= + + + , 
After providing specification for our test score equations it might be worth emphasizing 
the importance of ability controls in the wage equation by providing a brief illustration: 
 
Suppose that the equation for log of wages is: 
 
1 2 3ln ( )i iW
 
where X represents all the relevant regressors except schooling and ability. Given this 
specification, the causal effect of a unit increase in schooling is 2β . 
Since f is unobserved it is common in empirical research to proxy f by test scores, T, to avoid 
ability bias arising from the correlation between f and S. Solving out for f using the test score 
equation (1): 
 
1 2 3
33 3
1 2
ln ( ) ( )
( )
( ) 3
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
k k
k
k k
k k k
k
W X S W
s
X S W
T s X s s
sX T s s
β β β ελ
ββ β ββ β ε
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k k k
k ks s s sλ λ λ λ
β µ ε
µβ ε
−′= + + +
′= + − − + + −
− −′
′
 
 
Two problems emerge: 1) ( )k s3( )k s
β
λ ε  is correlated with  as long as ( )kT s ( ) 0k sε ≠ , 
2) even if ( ) 0k sε =  , i.e. )kT s  is a perfect proxy for f, additional S- ependent terms are 
present in the equation due to the fact that schooling determines test scores, and the estimated 
marginal effect of schooling on wages, 2ˆ
( d
β , will be biased unless both ( )k sµ and ( )k sλ  are 
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con s unless schooling has neither direct effect on test scores nor indirect effect 
via 
stants, that i
manifest ability. Our specification allows us to eliminate these types of biases. 
 
Earnings 
Modeling returns to schooling involves two outcomes. One is the selection into work for
pay after leaving school. It resolves the endogeneity of the experience in the wage equation.
 
 
 if an individual 
is o
 
t in 
school by the time of the 2002-2003 survey, so selection into work is modeled explicitly only 
for those who are out of school. I model the work decisions, for those not in school, starting 
: 
 I
assume that working for pay contributes to human capital accumulation only
ut of school. Therefore, for each individual, the experience in the wage regression is the 
number of years she/he worked for pay while not attending school. The second outcome is a 
wage equation destined to provide the estimates of the return to schooling.  
Wages are initially modeled as of the time of the 2002-2003 survey, when approximately 
thirty percent of the sample were still in school. Later on I look as well at the wages as of the
time of the 2005 survey. The analysis of wages is limited to those individuals who are no
from the school year 1997/1998,13 when most of the sample were thirteen years of age
 
*
it R it R it R it R it R i itR X Z C L fα β ϕ ψ δ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + +  ξ
 
where *itR  is a latent index for whether person i is a wage worker during school year t; 
includes local labor market variables such as the average wage in the area. 
Wages are modeled by specifying the equation for the logarithm of hourly wage rate. 
itL  
Several specifications are used. I start with a separate Mincer-type equation, which is 
                                                 
13 For the school year 1996/1997, only nineteen people reported working for pay while being out of school.  
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routinely used in the literature on returns to schooling, 0 1 2ln i i i iW S experα α α ξ= + + + . I do
not include the quadr
 
atic in experience due 
spe es will 
to very young age of the workers. In this 
cification, the assumption that the only cost of additional schooling is forgone wag
yield 1α  as the private rate of return to schooling. 
The preferred specification allows i) the rate of return to education to vary across 
individuals by unobserved ability and ii) unobserved ability to affect the wages directly. This 
specification is: 
 
,2002ln i w i w i w i w i i w i itW X C S S f fα ϕ γ η δ ξ
 
Other variab
′ ′= + + + ⋅ + +  
les in the equation are used to capture the formation of human capital besides 
schooling and ability, as well as to control for observed heterogeneity in, for instance, local 
labo
ikelihood Function 
The individual likelihood after integrating out unobserved ability is the following: 
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whe r of points of support chosen for the Gauss-Hermite quadrature, re K is the numbe kπ  is 
the probability weight that the unobserved ability f  takes on the mass point kf . The sample 
likelihood is given by the product of the individual likelihoods. 
 
Identification 
Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004) prove nonparametric identification of unobserv
ability and the identification of the model in a static version of this model. The factor 
structure assumption for the unobserved ability and the concept of “measurable separability
are key to the identification. The latter, in their model, b
ed 
” 
oils down to having individuals with 
different amounts of schooling at the tim
ese 
ge 
e tests are taken. Heckman and Navarro (2005) 
provide a detailed proof of semiparametric identification for more general dynamic discrete 
choice models in which agents sequentially update the information on which they act. The 
outcomes are allowed to be mixed discrete-continuous. 
Additionally, the analysis contains numerous time-varying exogenous variables. Th
include an urban community dummy, local food prices, school characteristics and local wage 
rates. The studies by Bhargava (1991), Mroz and Surette (1998), and Mroz and Sava
(forthcoming) show that the time dimension for the exogenous time-varying instruments like 
these provides many more identification conditions than one might achieve by simply 
counting the number of contemporaneous exogenous variables excluded from an equation of 
interest. As an example, consider school characteristics. In 1992, variation in these 
characteristics has a direct impact on schooling outcomes. Similarly, variation in 1990 has a 
direct impact on 1990 outcomes. Because of the timing of decision-making, however, the 
1990 school characteristics do not have a direct effect on 1992 outcomes except through the 
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accumulated stock of human capital as of 1992. As a consequence, the 1990 characteristics 
are, theoretically, instruments for human capital stock observed in 1992. This logic certainly 
applies to other time-varying exogenous variables used in the analysis. Hence, there are 
numerous instruments available. This provides implicit exclusion restrictions, i.e., additional 
multiple identifications, to our model. In addition, treating migration as exogenous gives us 
even more variation in exogenous characteristics. 
 
 30
  
CHAPTER  V 
RESULTS  
 
The model is estimated using FORTRAN with analytic first derivatives, in conjunction 
with the GQOPT optimization library. The first part of the analysis involves surveys only up 
to the 2002-2003 survey. The number of mass points used for Gauss-Hermite quadrature is 
15 (further increase in the number of quadrature points did not improve the likelihood 
function). The estimates are reported in Appendix B  
In each of our outcomes, impact of the unobserved factor operates in the direction one 
would expect unobserved ability to operate. The estimates suggest that boys enter school 
later than girls. Conditional on gender, children with lower ability enter school at a later age 
(Table 14). The same applies to the children with poor health as measured by the child’s 
height at the time of his/her second birthday. The latter is in agreement with findings of 
Glewwe, Jacoby, and King (2001), even though I do not control for the endogeneity of a 
child’s health in the model.  
As can be seen from Tables 15-17, children with lower ability face lower probabilities of 
attending school. They are also much more likely to drop out of school at all three levels of 
education (Tables 18-20), with the effect of lower ability diminishing at higher levels of 
education. For example, one standard deviation decrease in unobserved ability implies a 7.5 
percentage point higher probability of dropping out of elementary school, a 6.7 percentage 
  
point higher probability of dropping out of high school, and a 4.7 percentage point higher 
probability of dropping out of college.14  
A key question is whether we can keep the low-ability dropouts in school longer. More 
importantly, would this additional schooling benefit individuals in the labor market? The 
answers to these questions lie in the wage equation: if the return to schooling is large in 
absolute terms, then the counterfactual additional schooling would certainly, on average, pay 
off for school dropouts. However, if the return is small, then additional resources spent on 
making this subgroup of population stay longer in school might be wasteful, at least for the 
low-ability subgroup. In this respect, our estimates from the wage equations are informative. 
While standard Mincer-type wage regression (Table 22) yields a 4.5 percentage point return 
per additional year of schooling (which is in broad agreement with Schady 2003), our model 
reveals that the introduction of unobserved ability and controlling for the endogeneity of 
acquired schooling reduces the estimated return by almost 2 percentage points, down to 2.7 (I 
allow returns to schooling to vary by ability by introducing the ability-schooling interaction, 
but the corresponding estimate is essentially zero). In other words, results suggest a presence 
of an omitted ability bias in the conventional estimates of the return to schooling. At the 
same time, the estimated coefficient on unobserved ability is 8 (although it is statistically 
insignificant). This implies that one would have to acquire about three additional years of 
education to compensate for one standard deviation lower innate ability in terms of labor 
market returns, ceteris paribus.  
Looking at average marginal effects, improving school quality appears to increase 
achievement test scores. These effects, however, are quite small. Decreasing the local pupil-
                                                 
14 These numbers, as well as all other estimates for discrete outcomes (Tables 14-21), represent average 
marginal effects (i.e., marginal effects are computed for each individual and then averaged across the sample).  
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teacher ratio, for example, by one standard deviation, 5.19, is expected to increase Math test 
scores by only .32 score points, or less than one tenth of the standard deviation. Lower pupil-
teacher ratio yields higher rates of elementary school completion, but the effect is similarly 
small. A one standard deviation decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio is expected to increase the 
elementary school completion rate by .8 percentage points. Surprisingly, the fraction of 
women with primary education and the fraction of women with more than primary education 
in each community (proxies for high school quality) have only small effects on the outcomes 
of interest. Looking at the effects of low birth weight, it is worth noting that low birth weight 
seems to hurt children at early stages of education, as reflected by lower test scores and lower 
probability of completing primary school. However, this effect virtually disappears later on. 
Higher family income appears to benefit both attendance and completion of elementary 
school, and it strongly affects high school and post-secondary school attendance.  
The above discussion is based on the analysis of average marginal effects, and these do 
not reflect all of the complex relationships among our outcomes. To provide a more 
comprehensive assessment, I make a series of policy simulations by: 1) doubling household 
income in all time periods; 2) increasing the mother’s education by one standard deviation, 
i.e., by 3.29 years of education; 3) assigning low birth weight to everyone in the sample; or 
4) decreasing local pupil-teacher ratio by one standard deviation, i.e., by 5.19. The approach 
to implementing simulations is standard: a whole life-cycle to age at the time of the 2002-
2003 survey is generated for each individual using estimated structural parameters of the 
model based on the specified policy change. The standard errors on the effects are estimated 
using a parametric bootstrap with 50 iterations. The resulting effects of policy changes on 
major outcomes of interest are reported below in Table 5.  
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The effects are qualitatively similar to the previously discussed average marginal effects, 
with the increase in the mother’s education producing the largest effect on the outcomes. For 
instance, while increasing the mother’s education raises the probability of successfully 
completing elementary school by 2.1 percentage points, doubling household income in all 
time periods leads to only a .6 percentage point increase in the rate of successful elementary 
school completion. It is difficult, however, to compare the effects to each other since each of 
them implies different costs behind it. It is much easier from policymaking perspective, for 
instance, to decrease the class size in schools than to increase parental education.   
Table 5. Policy simulation results 
Outcome 
Doubling 
household 
income 
Increasing 
mother’s 
education 
Assigning low 
birth weight to 
everyone 
Decreasing 
local pupil-
teacher ratio 
 
Entered school on time 
 
0.0186 
(0.0172)15
0.0552 
(0.0081) 
0.0079 
(0.0059) 
-0.0214 
(0.0135) 
Attended elementary school 
 
0.0107 
(0.0036) 
0.0357 
(0.0045) 
0.0020 
(0.0021) 
0.0061 
(0.0043) 
Attended high school 
 
0.0093 
(0.0058) 
0.0248 
(0.0052) 
-0.0009 
(0.0026) 
-0.0065 
(0.0075) 
Attended college 
 
0.0172 
(0.0108) 
0.0247 
(0.0109) 
-0.0014 
(0.0050) 
0.0020 
(0.0129) 
Successfully completed the 
grade, elementary school 
 
0.0063 
(0.0029) 
0.0213 
(0.0029) 
0.0017 
(0.0012) 
0.0049 
(0.0030) 
Successfully completed the 
grade, high school 
 
-0.0029 
(0.0046) 
0.0158 
(0.0030) 
-0.0011 
(0.0019) 
-0.0011 
(0.0049) 
Successfully completed the 
grade, college 
 
0.0053 
(0.0167) 
0.0324 
(0.0178) 
-0.0033 
(0.0054) 
-0.0044 
(0.0221) 
Math test scores 
 
0.3539 
(0.1872) 
2.2841 
(0.1659) 
0.2042 
(0.0923) 
0.3145 
(0.2832) 
English test scores 
 
0.6955 
(0.1685) 
2.4074 
(0.1857) 
0.1440 
(0.0830) 
0.4168 
(0.2580) 
Completed schooling as of 
2002 
 
0.1339 
(0.0324) 
0.5213 
(0.0405) 
0.0189 
(0.0233) 
0.0187 
(0.0539) 
Log of the hourly wage rate 
 
0.0089 
(0.0091) 
0.0156 
(0.0161) 
0.0025 
(0.0073) 
0.0003 
(0.0073) 
 
                                                 
15 Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors are estimated using parametric bootstrap with 50 
iterations. 
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When discussing the results, especially from the wage equation, several limitations 
should be noted. Our sample represents very young wage workers, about nineteen years old 
at the time of the 2002-2003 survey. So early in their careers some of them may exhibit 
unusual behavior, confounding the effects of schooling and ability. For example, some high-
ability individuals might choose to stay out of school and take low-paying jobs to get more 
experience. Also, as was previously pointed out, a significant fraction of our sample was still 
in school at the time of the 2002-2003 survey. We, potentially, do not observe the entire 
range of completed schooling and, perhaps, ability. In order to help resolve these limitations I 
supplement the analysis with the most recent data from the 2005 survey. Several other 
important extensions are carried out in the next section.  
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CHAPTER  VI 
EXTENSIONS 
 
Relaxing normality assumption 
In the above specification the unobserved ability was assumed to follow standard normal 
distribution. The true distribution of the unobserved ability, however, is unknown and does 
not have to be normal. The main question here is whether the results are sensitive to the 
distributional assumptions about the unobserved ability.  
I relax the normality assumption by estimating the probability weights for the fixed mass 
points of the unobserved distribution. A new probability weight, , is introduced: 
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 ( )2 31 2 3
3
ln ( ) ( )
1
,
kl h lL π θ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟
1
ln ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* ( )
k
k
l h l h l h l
l
l
e
e π θ θ θπ
=
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
=
∑
=
∑  
where ( )lπ  is a Gauss-Hermite probability weight that corresponds to the l-th Gauss-
Herm ss point,  is the l-th Gauss-Hermite mass point. If coefficients ite ma ( )h l 1θ , 2θ , 3θ  
are equal to zero the specification reduces to the normality. In other words, the model with 
ality assumption is nested in the new specification. Hence, we can use the likelihood norm
  
rati Both 
 
 
e specification is preferred. More 
important is, however, whether the results substantively change when the distributional 
                                                
o test to test the normality assumption. I estimated the model with new specification. 
distributions are displayed in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. Relaxing normality: two distributions of unobserved ability16  
 
Even though the graph of the estimated distribution appears to have shape somewhat
similar to the standard normal distribution the likelihood ratio test strongly rejects the 
normality assumption implying that the new more flexibl
 
16 Probabilities are plotted against corresponding mass points. “Normal” corresponds to the distribution of the 
unobserved ability in the specification with normality assumption. “New” corresponds to the distribution of the 
unobserved ability in the new specification where probability weights are estimated within the model. The 
“new” distribution is normalized to have zero mean and variance one to be comparable to standard normal. 
0
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assu ot. The results appear to be robust to relaxing 
the 
03 
h 
re than a year of working experience, on average. So early in their careers some of 
them
 
ass 
e 
he 
ility 
mption is relaxed. Surprisingly, they do n
distributional assumption for the unobserved ability. 
 
Adding data from the 2005 survey 
The most recent survey allows us to supplement our analysis with more complete 
schooling and labor market trajectories. This is important since at the time of the 2002-20
survey our sample represents very young wage workers, about nineteen years old, wit
slightly mo
 may exhibit unusual behavior, confounding the effects of schooling and ability and 
contributing to large standard errors of schooling and ability coefficients in the wage 
equation.  
Some of the descriptive statistics for the 2005 data are reported in a previously discussed
Table 3. For instance, as of the time of the 2005 survey individuals have, on average, more 
working experience, 3.1 years, compared to 1.2 years in the 2002 survey.  
Similar to previous analyses the model is estimated in FORTRAN. The number of m
points used is seven (further increase in the number of quadrature points did not improve th
likelihood function). The estimation results are reported in Tables 23-36.  
Unlike the results from the 2002-2003 data, unobserved ability coefficient and t
interaction term as well as the schooling coefficient become statistically significant in the 
wage equation (Table 26). The estimated coefficient on the interaction of unobserved ab
and schooling implies that the return to education now depends on an individual’s 
unobserved ability. An individual’s unobserved ability, however, is no longer assumed to 
follow standard normal distribution. Table 36 presents implied probabilities along with 
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corresponding mass points. Since the mean of the distribution is -0.86 the return to educatio
for an individual with an average ability is estimated to be 4.59 percentage points (6.074-
0.86*1.721) which is fairly close to 4.27 percentage points from the Mincer-type regression
(Table 37). A one standard deviation higher ability increases the return by 2.65 percentage 
points (1.54*1.72). Signs on the direct effect of unobse
n 
 
rved ability and the interaction of the 
abil f the 
dual’s 
n 
ame effect in terms of the magnitude 
and  
ng 
The estimates from the rest of the equations suggest results qualitatively very similar to 
the previous analysis. This should not be surprising since the 2005 survey provided more 
data only on earnings and two additional years in the schooling trajectories. 
ity with schooling in the wage equation suggest that the sign and the magnitude o
cumulative effect of an individual’s ability on wages depend on the level of an indivi
ability as well as the amount of completed schooling.  
A seemingly strange result in the wage equation is a negative effect of working 
experience. The sign is robust to the model specification, it is negative in any of the 
specifications discussed in this work including basic Mincer-type wage regression. In a
attempt to resolve this issue I constructed two experience variables, “experience as of the 
time of the 2002-2003 survey” and “any additional experience acquired since the 2002-2003 
survey (as of the 2005 survey)”. This, however, did not change the estimated effect of 
working experience – both variables had virtually the s
 the sign. Including only “experience as of the time of the 2002-2003 survey” in the wage
equation yielded no changes either. Unfortunately, I have no explanation to why the worki
experience has a negative effect in the wage equation. 
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Polynomial in unobserved ability and conditional density estimation 
(CDE) 
In order to provide more flexible controls for the unobserved ability a second-degree 
polynomial in the unobserved ability is used in each equation. The new squared term has 
statistically significant estimated effects in most of the equations. The likelihood ratio test 
accepts new richer specification.  
In addition to the polynomial in unobserved ability I adopt conditional density estimation 
(CDE) approach proposed by Gilleskie and Mroz (2004). This approach allows to relax 
functional form and distributional assumptions for continuous outcomes. I use the CDE 
approach in the specification of the wage equation. I partition the distribution of wages into 
ten discrete cells, i.e. deciles, and model the probability of an advance to a higher, discretized 
wage level through the logit hazard rate model. 
The results are reported in Tables 38-50. The number of mass points used for the 
distribution of the unobserved ability in the estimation is 11. The implied probabilities are 
reported in Table 51. The average marginal effects for the CDE specification are reported in 
Table 49. The return to education appears to be only 2.9 percentage points in the CDE 
specification.  
The rest of the equations reveal results that appear to be similar to what we have 
previously found. Namely, boys enter school later than girls. They also perform worse at the 
cognitive achievement tests. Children with lower ability are much more likely to drop out of 
school at all three levels of education. The test scores appear to be strongly affected by the 
amount of completed schooling at the time of the test. For that reason whenever such a test is 
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used as a proxy for an individual’s ability it will necessarily be picking up some of the 
schooling effect. 
Given the nonlinear nature of the estimation framework, however, and complex 
relationships among the outcomes it is difficult to interpret most of the estimates in a 
meaningful way other than via a series of simulations. I make a series of policy simulations 
by: 1) doubling household income in all time periods; 2) increasing the mother’s education 
by one standard deviation, i.e., by 3.29 years of education; or 4) decreasing local pupil-
teacher ratio by one standard deviation, i.e., by 5.19. The approach to implementing 
simulations is the same as previously: a whole life-cycle to the age at the time of the 2005 
survey is generated for each individual using estimated structural parameters of the model 
based on the specified policy change. The standard errors on the effects are being estimated 
using a parametric bootstrap and will be reported during the defense. The resulting effects of 
policy changes on major outcomes of interest are reported in Table 6.  
The estimates from Table 6 appear to be very similar to the results from Table 5. All of 
the effects in Table 6 appear to be fairly small. Even ignoring potential costs associated with 
each policy change and comparing the effects to each other, the largest increase in the 
amount of completed schooling is only 0.8. Similarly, the rates of successful school 
completion are hardly affected by the simulated changes suggesting, perhaps, that in a 
country with relatively high primary school enrollment and completion rates, like the 
Philippines, policies oriented toward the achievement of universal primary education might 
need to be more refined than just increasing educational expenditures. 
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Table 6. Policy simulation results 
Outcome Doubling household income
Increasing 
mother’s 
education 
Decreasing local 
pupil-teacher ratio
 
Entered school on time 
 
0.014117 
(0.0144) 
 
0.0560 
(0.0083) 
-0.0201 
(0.0154) 
Attended elementary school 
 
0.0160 
(0.0051) 
 
0.0516 
(0.0056) 
0.0025  
(0.0050) 
Attended high school 
 
0.0106 
(0.0070) 
 
0.0453 
(0.0071) 
-0.0088 
(0.0080) 
Attended college 
 
-0.0013 
(0.0092) 
 
0.0369 
(0.0072) 
-0.0114 
(0.0146) 
Successfully completed the 
grade, elementary school 
 
0.0050 
(0.0026) 
  
0.0207 
(0.0029) 
0.0037 
(0.0025) 
Successfully completed the 
grade, high school 
 
-0.0040 
(0.0038) 
 
0.0158  
(0.0033) 
-0.0022 
(0.0053) 
Successfully completed the 
grade, college 
 
-0.0036 
(0.0080) 
 
0.0198 
(0.0062) 
-0.0117 
(0.0130) 
Math test scores 
 
0.2492 
(0.1972) 
 
2.2751 
(0.1651) 
0.0555 
(0.2522) 
English test scores 
 
0.5589 
(0.1841) 
 
2.4123 
(0.1538) 
0.1955 
(0.2445) 
Completed schooling as of 
2005 
 
0.1340 
(0.0566) 
 
0.8002 
(0.0508) 
-0.0831 
(0.0760) 
Log of the hourly wage rate 
 
0.0045 
(0.0035) 
0.0276 
(0.0058) 
-0.0049 
(0.0043) 
 
Nonlinear effects of schooling 
In all of the above analyses we implicitly assumed that return to education is the same 
across all three levels of education, i.e., primary school, high school and college. As 
evidenced by the existing literature on the returns to schooling such an assumption might be 
too strong. In order to relax the linearity in schooling we adopt the following specification: 
                                                 
17 Standard errors are estimated via parametric bootstrap with 50 iterations. 
 41
  
 
ln [ 6 ( 6)] [ 10 ( 10)] ,i i i i i i iW X S D S D S iα γ η δ′= + + − + − +ξ  
 
where  is the amount of completed schooling,  and  are dummy variables for 
those who have completed at least 6 and 10 years of schooling, respectively, 
iS 6iD 10iD
6 ( 6)i iD S −  is 
an interaction term between the  dummy and (6iD 6)iS − , 10 ( 10)i iD S −  is an interaction 
term between the  dummy and 10iD ( 10)iS − . In this specification the mean rate of return to 
primary education is given by the coefficient γ , the mean rate of return to high school is 
given by the sum of the coefficients γ  and η , the mean rate of return to college education 
is given by the sum of the coefficients γ , η  and δ . 
The model is estimated with the above specification for the wage equation using the 
FIML, with a 2nd degree polynomial in unobserved ability and a 3rd degree polynomial in 
probability parameters that determine probability weights. Results for a wage equation only 
are reported below in Table 7. Even though none of the schooling coefficients is statistically 
significant the likelihood-ratio test suggests that the two additional coefficients are jointly 
significant, new more flexible specification is preferred. The schooling coefficients suggest 
considerable nonlinearity of the returns to schooling. Taking into account the interaction of 
schooling and unobserved ability, the mean rate of return to primary education for an 
individual with average ability is estimated to be very close to zero, 0.13 percentage points (-
0.88+1.01). The mean rate of return to high school for an individual with an average ability is 
estimated to be 3.01 percentage points (-0.88+2.88+1.01). The mean rate of return to college 
education for an individual with an average ability is estimated to be 8.63 (-0.88+  
+2.88+5.62+1.01).  
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Table 7. Log of Hourly Wage Rate Equation, Nonlinear in Schooling 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Male 0.24856 0.04702 5.286 
Age 0.11629 0.07256 1.603 
Experience -0.03939 0.01907 -2.065 
Completed schooling -0.00881 0.02849 -0.309 
6 ( 6)D S −  0.02877 0.04185 0.688 
10 ( 10)D S −  0.05622 0.03445 1.632 
Urban -0.10584 0.07551 -1.402 
Population density (log) 0.05141 0.02276 2.259 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor -0.00159 0.00307 -0.519 
Constant 0.04808 1.55108 0.031 
    
f (unobserved ability) -0.02347
18 0.05514 -0.426 
f^2 (unobserved ability, squared) -0.00616 0.00585 -1.053 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 0.00688 0.00644 1.069 
 
OLS vs. FIML 
It is a valid question to ask whether specifications simpler than the proposed 
simultaneous equations framework can do as well as our preferred specification. While we 
have already compared some of our results to Mince-type wage regression, Table 8 below 
provides a much more comprehensive comparison. Rows 1-5 represent several variations of 
the classical Mincer-type wage regression, from basic, most popular specification,(1), to the 
one with spline functions and IQ variable as a proxy for an individual’s unobserved ability, 
(5). Rows 6-10 represent a simple OLS regression with extra explanatory variables in 
addition to basic Mincer-type specification, the set of regressors is identical to the one we use 
                                                 
18 The distribution of the unobserved ability is estimated to have mean 1.47 and variance 3.40. 
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in our FIML specification. Rows 11-12 represent full-information maximum likelihood 
specifications, first with linearity.  
Table 8. Various Specifications of Wage Regressions: OLS and FIML 
 Schooling (S) D6*(S-6) D10*(S-10) IQ
19 or f 
Interaction 
of IQ/f and 
schooling 
      
(1) Mincer-type, 
linear in S 
.04320
(.011) –– –– –– –– 
      
(2) ‘Mincer’, linear in S, 
with IQ 
.039 
(.011) –– –– 
.046 
(.022) –– 
      
(3) ‘Mincer’, with IQ and 
IQ*S 
.045 
(.011) –– –– 
-.098 
(.063) 
.017 
(.007) 
      
(4) ‘Mincer’, spline in S -.007 (.027) 
.049 
(.037) 
.072 
(.024) –– –– 
      
(5) ‘Mincer’, spline in S, 
with IQ and IQ*S 
.008 
(.029) 
.027 
(.037) 
.068 
(.025) 
-.013 
(.071) 
.007 
(.008) 
      
(6) Type 2 OLS, 
linear in S 
.038 
(.011) –– –– –– –– 
      
(7) Type 2, linear in S, 
with IQ 
.032 
(.011) –– –– 
.056 
(.023) –– 
      
(8) Type 2, with IQ and 
IQ*S 
.039 
(.011) –– –– 
-.075 
(.064) 
.016 
(.007) 
      
(9) Type 2, spline in S -.008 (.027) 
.047 
(.037) 
.069 
(.025) –– –– 
      
(10) Type 2, spline in S, 
with IQ and IQ*S 
.005 
(.029) 
.026 
(.037) 
.063 
(.025) 
.001 
(.072) 
.007 
(.008) 
      
(11) FIML, wages linear 
in S 
0.061 
(0.017) –– –– 
-0.12621
(0.054) 
0.017 
(0.005 
      
(12) FIML, spline in S 0.013 (0.049) 
0.030 
(0.043) 
0.055 
(0.037) 
-0.02322
(0.089) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
                                                 
19 IQ test scorers are normalized to have mean zero and variance one for corresponding regressions in this 
Table. 
20 Estimates in bold are statistically significant under conventional 5% significance level. 
21 The distribution of the unobserved ability is estimated to have the mean of -0.86 and the variance 2.38. 
22 The distribution of the unobserved ability is estimated to have the mean of -1.70 and the variance 1.54. 
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in schooling imposed and then with spline functions in schooling. In both of FIML 
specifications I used a 1st degree polynomial in unobserved ability to ease comparison to 
OLS regressions in Table 8.23 To make better sense of the estimates in Table 8 I computed 
the corresponding rates of return to education by educational level for an individual with an 
average ability. They are presented in Table 9. As can be seen from the tables, when linearity 
 
Table 9. Interpreting Results From Table 8: Mean Rates of Return to 
Education, by Educational Level, for an individual with average ability 
(wherever appropriate). 
 
 Rate of return to primary school 
Rate of return to 
high school 
Rate of return to 
college education 
    
(1) Mincer-type, 
 linear in S 4.3 4.3 4.3 
    
(3) ‘Mincer’, with IQ and 
IQ*S 4.5 4.5 4.5 
    
(4) ‘Mincer’, spline in S -0.7 4.2 11.4 
    
(5) ‘Mincer’, spline in S, 
with IQ and IQ*S 0.8 3.5 10.3 
    
(6) Type 2 OLS, 
 linear in S 3.8 3.8 3.8 
    
(8) Type 2, with IQ and 
IQ*S 3.9 3.9 3.9 
    
(9) Type 2, spline in S -0.8 3.9 10.8 
    
(10) Type 2, spline in S, 
with IQ and IQ*S 0.5 3.1 9.4 
    
(11) FIML, wages linear 
in S 4.6 4.6 4.6 
    
(12) FIML, spline in S -0.1 3.1 8.6 
 
                                                 
23 In other words, row 11 results are equivalent to the wage equation estimates reported in Appendix C. Row 12 
differs from Table 7 specification only in the degree of polynomial for the unobserved ability, this difference 
does not, however, change estimated rates of return (that will become obvious in the next table). 
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in schooling is imposed ‘Mincer’-type regression yields schooling coefficients very close to 
what the FIML gives us (compare (1) or (3) to (11)). Linear wage regression, however, 
appear to be severely misspecified, rates of return to education appear to be nonlinear. When 
spline functions are introduced the Mincer-type regressions inflates the estimated returns by 
at least 19% for college education, 13% for high school and by at least 600% for primary 
school. Type 2 specification, in which we use a broader range of regressors than in the 
Mincer-type, when paired with IQ variable produces the set of estimated rates of return that 
are much closer to our preferred specification (compare (10) to (12)) by introducing only 9% 
bias for college education, 0% for high school and 600% for primary school.  
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CHAPTER  VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using rich data from the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey, I analyze the 
role of an individual’s unobserved innate ability in explaining school attendance and 
completion, and early labor market outcomes of young Filipino adults. 
I find that children with lower innate ability enter school at a later age, complete fewer 
years of school, and are more likely to drop out of school at all levels of education. From a 
policy making perspective, I find that enhanced conventional school inputs, such as pupil-
teacher ratios, do little to keep young children in school. My results suggest that in a country 
with relatively high primary school enrollment and completion rates, like the Philippines, 
policies oriented toward the achievement of universal primary education might need to be 
more refined than just increasing educational expenditures. A series of policy changes, 
unfortunately, did not reveal any sound instruments that could significantly improve 
schooling and labor market outcomes of the individuals in the Philippines. Policy 
simulations, however, suggest a noticeable intergenerational effect of higher amount of 
completed education. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in mother’s education is 
associated with a 0.8 increase in the amount of completed education for her children. 
With respect to labor market outcomes of school dropouts in the Philippines, I find that 
the returns to education, after controlling for ability, are smaller in the Philippines than in 
most of developing countries which is in agreement with existing literature. In the analysis of 
  
returns to education a standard Mincer-type regression appears to be misspecified. Results 
reveal significant heterogeneity in the returns to schooling by an individual’s ability. Rates of 
return to education appear to be strongly nonlinear. Our preferred estimates suggest that the 
mean rate of return to primary education for an individual with average ability is close to 
zero, -0.1 percentage points; the mean rate of return to high school for an individual with 
average ability is 3 percentage points; the mean rate of return to college education for an 
individual with average ability is 8.6 percentage points.  
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APPENDIX A: Constructed Variables 
The variable “Entered school on time” is equal to one if a child entered school at age less 
than 7.5 years old, it is zero otherwise. “Low birth weigh” is equal to one if the weight of a 
child at birth was 2.5 kilograms or less, zero otherwise. “Age as of” represents the age of a 
person at the beginning of the school year. The school year starts in June in the Philippines. 
“Completed schooling at t” represents the number of successfully completed grades by 
school year t. 
School quality characteristics that I use are measures aggregated from individual-level 
school measures. The reason for doing this is the fact that individual school quality measures 
cannot be constructed for everyone in the sample, but only for those who attended a “primary 
only” type of school (as opposed to “primary and high school in one” or “high school only”). 
Although a “primary only” type of school is predominant in Cebu (around 87-90 percent of 
all schools), I did not want to lose a portion of the sample. Two measures are used for 
primary school: pupil-teacher ratio and public school dummy. They are constructed based on 
the school questionnaires administered during the 1994-1995 survey and on a supplemental 
1996 survey.  
None of the CLHNS data contain high school characteristics. To resolve that issue, I have 
merged 2000 census data from the Philippines at the barangay (community) level with my 
sample by barangay of residence. Such measures as “Fraction of women with primary 
education in barangay” and “Fraction of women with more than primary education in 
barangay” were constructed to proxy for the quality of high schools in the areas of residence. 
The household income variable represents the average household income per week. It is 
calculated as the sum of three sources of income: 1) resources generated within and by the 
household (home gardening, income in kind, remittances, pensions, rent savings, etc.); 2) 
individual earnings (wages, piecework, fishing, self-employment); and 3) group earnings 
(livestock and farming). 
All the pecuniary measures (like household income and food prices) were deflated to 
January 1983 pesos.  
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For all dynamic variables, like household and community characteristics, the data are 
assigned in the following way: years 1990-199324 use the data from the 1991-1992 survey, 
years 1994-1996 use the data from the 1994-1995 survey, years 1997-1999 use the data from 
the 1998-1999 survey, years 2000-2002 use the data from the 2002-2003 survey, years 2003-
2005 use the data from the 2005 survey. The only exception is community characteristics for 
years 2003-2005. As of now the community data from the 2005 survey has not been 
processed yet. For that reason I used community data from the 2002-2003 survey for years 
2003-2005. 
 
School grade progression 
The variables ATTND and SUCSS are created for each educational subgroup. Modeling 
of ATTND_elementary starts with the year after the first school entry, conditional on 
completed schooling as of the time of that decision; ATTND_high has a nonmissing value 
starting with the year right after the year when the last grade of primary school was 
completed; ATTND_college is modeled starting with the year right after the year when the 
last grade of high school was completed. 
 
Earnings 
2002-2003 survey: In the final sample, 1,781 reported working, of whom 1,333 were 
working for pay. Only 1,234 were out of school at the time of the 2002-2003 survey. In the 
analysis of earnings, we limit the sample to only those who reported both working and being 
out of school by the time of the 2002-2003 survey, that is 1,179 people. Out of these 1,179, 
wage workers comprise 931. Five people are dropped as outliers in the hourly wage rate 
distribution (these five reported hourly wages above 400 pesos, while the 99th percentile had 
250 pesos per hour). That leaves us with 926 wage workers (509 men and 417 women). 
Hourly wage rate was computed using available information on: 1) reported earnings per day, 
2) reported number of days working per week, and 3) reported number of hours working per 
week. For those who reported “no regular workday” as their number of working days per 
week, it is assumed they worked five days a week (48 individuals). 
                                                 
24 The year sequence starts from 1990 because only twenty-two people attended school in year 1989 (once 
again, all references to years are references to school years, e.g., “year 1990” means “school year 1990/1991”). 
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2005 survey: Wage workers comprise 1219. Four people are dropped as outliers in the 
hourly wage rate distribution (these four reported hourly wages above 450 pesos, while the 
99th percentile had 250 pesos per hour). That leaves us with 1215 wage workers (665 men 
and 550 women). 
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APPENDIX B: Estimates 
 
Table 10. Math Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 2.1125 0.2749 7.6830 
Age as of test date 2.8786 0.4892 5.8850 
Male -3.2162 0.4313 -7.4570 
Low birth weight -1.5214 0.6314 -2.4090 
Caretaker’s household 0.7527 0.6759 1.1140 
Mother’s education (log) 5.1670 0.4991 10.3530 
Family business 0.3655 0.3603 1.0140 
Household size -0.1839 0.0781 -2.3560 
Household income (log) 0.4162 0.2479 1.6790 
Urban 3.3400 0.7728 4.3220 
Price of bananas -22.9137 8.5506 -2.6800 
Price of corn -0.7767 1.1067 -0.7020 
Price of kerosene 2.1595 1.7458 1.2370 
Population density (log) -1.0676 0.2455 -4.3490 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.0621 0.0468 -1.3290 
Fraction of public schools in the area -1.1960 4.2673 -0.2800 
Constant -9.3178 10.4155 -0.895 
    
f (unobserved ability) 2.9237 0.7358 3.973 
f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 1.2277 0.1708 7.186 
  
N=1,953, εσ = 4.80 
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Table 11. English Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 0.9808 0.2647 3.705 
Age as of test date 3.3837 0.4735 7.146 
Male -3.8373 0.4105 -9.348 
Low birth weight  -1.1679 0.6023 -1.939 
Caretaker’s household 0.3564 0.6466 0.551 
Mother’s education (log) 6.0434 0.4502 13.425 
Family business -0.6126 0.346 -1.771 
Household size -0.2962 0.0731 -4.052 
Household income (log) 1.0106 0.2441 4.14 
Urban 2.4438 0.7637 3.2 
Price of bananas -5.8483 8.8165 -0.663 
Price of corn -0.211 1.0005 -0.211 
Price of kerosene 4.6883 1.6753 2.799 
Population density (log) -0.5747 0.2261 -2.542 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.0841 0.0505 -1.664 
Fraction of public schools in the area -2.5295 4.1817 -0.605 
Constant -29.0479 9.3420 -3.109 
    
 f (unobserved ability) 1.9474 0.6806 2.861 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 1.4139 0.1526 9.265 
  
N=1,953, εσ = 4.42 
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Table 12. IQ Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 1.3248 0.2721 4.869 
Age as of test date -4.0188 0.5861 -6.857 
Male -0.348 0.2926 -1.189 
Low birth weight  -0.7279 0.4124 -1.765 
Caretaker’s household 0.4923 0.5217 0.944 
Mother’s education (log) 2.8393 0.3501 8.11 
Family business -0.0525 0.2974 -0.176 
Household size -0.2305 0.0622 -3.707 
Household income (log) 0.7222 0.2983 2.421 
Urban 0.5586 0.5388 1.037 
Price of bananas -6.7527 3.7945 -1.78 
Price of corn 0.2456 0.4849 0.506 
Price of kerosene 0.13 0.1982 0.656 
Population density (log) 0.1329 0.1667 0.798 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.0028 0.0334 -0.084 
Fraction of public schools in the area 1.326 2.915 0.455 
Constant 55.8985 6.6202 8.444 
    
 f (unobserved ability) 3.804 0.314 12.114 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) -0.8788 0.2072 -4.242 
  
N=1,949, εσ = 5.17 
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Table 13. Log of Hourly Wage Rate 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Male 0.3877 0.07 5.537 
Age 0.1345 0.1157 1.163 
Experience 0.0186 0.0356 0.524 
Completed schooling 0.0267 0.0232 1.153 
Urban 0.0071 0.1196 0.06 
Population density (log) 0.007 0.0371 0.189 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor -0.0084 0.0051 -1.653 
Constant -0.3009 2.1626 -0.139 
    
 f (unobserved ability) 0.0805 0.1235 0.652 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) -0.0008 0.0135 -0.06 
  
N=918, εσ = 0.92 
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Table 14. Entered School on Time 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
Male -0.0478 -2.41 
Caretaker’s household 0.0004 0.01 
Low birth weight -0.0482 -1.638 
Height of the child  1.0761 4.368 
Household income (lagged) 0.0276 1.268 
Mother’s education (log) 0.1476 6.841 
Family business -0.0402 -1.846 
Urban (averaged across time) -0.1140 -3.007 
Population density (log, averaged) 0.0311 2.763 
Price of kerosene (log, averaged) -0.0855 -2.139 
Price of bananas (log, averaged) 0.0653 1.178 
Price of corn (log, averaged) -0.1392 -1.72 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.0037 1.681 
Fraction of public schools in the area 0.2703 1.41 
f (unobserved ability) 0.0586 5.026 
N=1,963 
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Table 15. “Did individual i attend ELEMENTARY school during  
school year t?” 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
Missed school last year -0.0929 -23.126 
Failed last grade -0.0477 -11.715 
Completed schooling as of t -0.0069 -4.27 
Age as of t -0.0113 -9.12 
Male -0.0073 -2.039 
Low birth weight -0.0042 -0.988 
Caretaker’s household 0.0050 1.155 
Mother’s education (log) 0.0213 5.68 
Family business 0.0028 0.892 
Household size -0.0019 -3.311 
Household income (log) 0.0050 2.024 
Urban 0.0028 0.499 
Price of bananas -0.0433 -1.31 
Price of corn 0.0185 2.943 
Price of kerosene -0.0013 -0.284 
Population density (log) 0.0008 0.446 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.0004 -1.311 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.0184 -0.563 
f (unobserved ability) 0.0206 8.584 
  
N=11,489, N of individuals=1,953 
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Table 16. “Did individual i attend HIGH school during school year t?” 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
First year of high school -0.1467 -13.535 
Missed school last year -0.2777 -25.284 
Failed last grade -0.2235 -20.06 
Completed schooling as of t -0.1008 -19.882 
Age as of t -0.0351 -7.272 
Male -0.0113 -1.535 
Low birth weight -0.0077 -0.746 
Caretaker’s household 0.0276 2.792 
Mother’s education (log) 0.0412 4.707 
Family business 0.0041 0.603 
Household size -0.0034 -2.648 
Household income (log) 0.0142 2.542 
Urban -0.0041 -0.285 
Price of bananas 0.0741 1.059 
Price of corn -0.0009 -0.038 
Price of kerosene -0.0300 -2.302 
Population density (log) -0.0064 -1.284 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.0002 0.305 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.0876 -1.359 
Fraction of women with primary education -0.3306 -3.394 
Fraction of women with more than primary -0.0341 -0.664 
f (unobserved ability) 0.0204 4.01 
  
N=8,638, N of individuals=1,736 
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Table 17. “Did individual i attend COLLEGE during school year t?” 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
First year of college 0.2268 4.484 
Missed school last year -0.2173 -4.993 
Failed last grade -0.3461 -7.97 
Completed schooling as of t 0.0610 2.17 
Age as of t -0.0402 -2.496 
Male -0.0121 -0.743 
Low birth weight 0.0163 0.583 
Caretaker’s household 0.0312 1.349 
Mother’s education (log) 0.0401 1.872 
Family business -0.0138 -0.867 
Household size -0.0035 -1.176 
Household income (log) 0.0264 2.27 
Urban 0.0302 1.105 
Price of bananas 0.0169 0.077 
Price of corn 0.0143 0.158 
Price of kerosene -0.0242 -0.556 
Population density (log) 0.0081 0.553 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.0005 -0.28 
Fraction of public schools in the area 0.1575 1.114 
Fraction of women with primary education -0.3131 -0.682 
Fraction of women with more than primary -0.3555 -1.403 
f (unobserved ability) 0.0089 0.847 
  
N=1,178, N of individuals=586 
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Table 18. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during 
school year t, ELEMENTARY school?” 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
Missed school last year -0.0602 -9.221 
Failed last grade -0.0113 -1.542 
Completed schooling as of t 0.0031 0.718 
Age as of t 0.0010 0.368 
Male -0.0507 -7.923 
Low birth weight -0.0192 -2.204 
Caretaker’s household 0.0161 1.853 
Mother’s education (log) 0.0630 8.438 
Family business 0.0026 0.49 
Household size -0.0044 -3.865 
Household income (log) 0.0127 2.845 
Urban 0.0127 1.305 
Price of bananas -0.0819 -1.347 
Price of corn 0.0220 2.765 
Price of kerosene 0.0001 0.033 
Population density (log) 0.0008 0.26 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.0012 -1.826 
Fraction of public schools in the area 0.0931 1.485 
f (unobserved ability) 0.0748 14.971 
  
N=12,176, N of individuals=1,957 
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Table 19. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school 
year t, HIGH school?” 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
First year of high school -0.0234 -1.218 
Missed school last year 0.0075 0.346 
Failed last grade -0.0866 -7.048 
Completed schooling as of t 0.0247 2.512 
Age as of t -0.0082 -1.215 
Male -0.1158 -10.637 
Low birth weight 0.0056 0.383 
Caretaker’s household 0.0573 4.259 
Mother’s education (log) 0.0691 5.491 
Family business 0.0186 2.103 
Household size -0.0001 -0.055 
Household income (log) 0.00005 0.006 
Urban -0.0364 -1.862 
Price of bananas -0.0248 -0.288 
Price of corn -0.0115 -0.386 
Price of kerosene -0.0084 -0.528 
Population density (log) -0.0006 -0.09 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.0001 0.104 
Fraction of public schools in the area 0.2408 2.717 
Fraction of women with primary education 0.0281 0.178 
Fraction of women with more than primary 0.0523 0.624 
f (unobserved ability) 0.0671 10.147 
  
N=6,451, N of individuals=1,731 
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Table 20. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school 
year t, COLLEGE?” 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
First year of college -0.0650 -0.131 
Missed school last year -0.1576 -2.02 
Failed last grade 0.0588 0.47 
Completed schooling as of t -0.0090 -0.018 
Age as of t 0.0857 1.829 
Male -0.0795 -2.345 
Low birth weight 0.0464 0.689 
Caretaker’s household 0.0877 1.559 
Mother’s education (log) 0.1061 2.212 
Family business 0.0133 0.405 
Household size -0.0035 -0.537 
Household income (log) 0.0070 0.29 
Urban -0.0719 -0.99 
Price of bananas 0.0902 0.213 
Price of corn -0.0632 -0.433 
Price of kerosene 0.0096 0.133 
Population density (log) 0.0254 0.915 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.0011 0.255 
Fraction of public schools in the area 0.1293 0.446 
Fraction of women with primary education 0.0907 0.132 
Fraction of women with more than primary 0.1467 0.454 
f (unobserved ability) 0.0467 1.972 
  
N=811, N of individuals=545 
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Table 21. Working for Pay During the Year t 
 
Variable Av. Marg. Effect t-statistic 
Age as of t 0.1169 13.426 
Male 0.0291 2.144 
Low birth weight 0.0465 2.411 
Mother’s education (log) -0.0712 -5.211 
Family business -0.0831 -6.122 
Household size 0.0037 1.614 
Household income net of individual’s (log) -0.0286 -3.539 
Urban -0.0060 -0.226 
Price of bananas 0.6305 3.747 
Price of corn 0.1605 3.182 
Price of kerosene 0.0455 1.939 
Population density (log) -0.0007 -0.074 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor as of t 0.0015 1.452 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.0007 0.547 
Fraction of public schools in the area 0.3655 2.882 
Fraction of women with primary education -0.0994 -0.577 
Fraction of women with more than primary 0.0583 0.669 
f (unobserved ability) -0.0096 -1.324 
  
N=3,898, N of individuals=1,454 
 
 
Table 22. Mincer-type Log Wage Regression 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Male 
 
.4057 
 
.0628 
 
6.46 
Experience 
 
.0258 
 
.0301 
 
0.86 
Completed schooling 
 
.0447 
 
.0143 
 
3.13 
Constant 
 
1.9696 
 
.1511 
 
13.03 
  
N=918, εσ = 0.92, 2R =0.04 
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APPENDIX C: Estimates, supplementing with the 2005 survey 
 
Table 23. Math Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 3.11492 0.37769 8.247 
Age as of test date 2.27098 0.49756 4.564 
Male -3.04256 0.4332 -7.024 
Low birth weight -0.99129 0.66148 -1.499 
Caretaker’s household 1.14632 0.68061 1.684 
Mother’s education (log) 4.89109 0.53859 9.081 
Family business 0.62614 0.37129 1.686 
Household size -0.19333 0.08121 -2.381 
Household income (log) 0.22211 0.26476 0.839 
Urban 3.39628 0.80304 4.229 
Price of bananas -25.8751 9.14074 -2.831 
Price of corn 0.04114 1.16724 0.035 
Price of kerosene 1.891 1.76208 1.073 
Population density (log) -1.03714 0.25299 -4.1 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.02382 0.04882 -0.488 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.62886 4.53253 -0.139 
Constant -4.21461 10.89893 -0.387 
    
f (unobserved ability) 1.84322 0.52379 3.519 
f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 0.78696 0.13427 5.861 
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Table 24. English Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 2.14434 0.37537 5.713 
Age as of test date 2.73246 0.48767 5.603 
Male -3.77085 0.4176 -9.03 
Low birth weight  -0.6899 0.62435 -1.105 
Caretaker’s household 0.95332 0.66066 1.443 
Mother’s education (log) 5.74045 0.47724 12.028 
Family business -0.47278 0.35945 -1.315 
Household size -0.28491 0.07634 -3.732 
Household income (log) 0.81043 0.25827 3.138 
Urban 2.59129 0.78464 3.303 
Price of bananas -9.69458 9.34356 -1.038 
Price of corn 0.10469 1.04911 0.1 
Price of kerosene 4.15973 1.75858 2.365 
Population density (log) -0.58657 0.2379 -2.466 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.06253 0.05108 -1.224 
Fraction of public schools in the area -1.46062 4.42113 -0.33 
Constant -21.7146 9.86754 -2.201 
    
 f (unobserved ability) 1.03949 0.49645 2.094 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 0.94294 0.12608 7.479 
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Table 25. IQ Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 0.78263 0.38547 2.03 
Age as of test date -4.26682 0.59916 -7.121 
Male -0.41946 0.30457 -1.377 
Low birth weight  -0.43979 0.42766 -1.028 
Caretaker’s household 0.59344 0.55004 1.079 
Mother’s education (log) 2.67701 0.37108 7.214 
Family business -0.02996 0.31368 -0.096 
Household size -0.28207 0.06502 -4.338 
Household income (log) 0.71683 0.31705 2.261 
Urban 0.39075 0.56902 0.687 
Price of bananas -7.02879 3.97768 -1.767 
Price of corn 0.22643 0.50342 0.45 
Price of kerosene 0.12219 0.20257 0.603 
Population density (log) 0.19194 0.17526 1.095 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.0087 0.03444 0.253 
Fraction of public schools in the area 1.51734 3.04717 0.498 
Constant 60.01885 7.04429 8.52 
    
 f (unobserved ability) 2.57793 0.24422 10.556 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) -0.65841 0.14383 -4.578 
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Table 26. Log of Hourly Wage Rate 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Male 0.24952 0.04695 5.314 
Age 0.11914 0.07186 1.658 
Experience -0.03753 0.01846 -2.033 
Completed schooling 0.06074 0.01682 3.611 
Urban -0.099 0.07424 -1.334 
Population density (log) 0.04974 0.02265 2.196 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor -0.00162 0.00309 -0.525 
Constant -0.48365 1.5542 -0.311 
    
 f (unobserved ability) -0.12613 0.0544 -2.318 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 0.01721 0.00521 3.305 
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Table 27. Entered School on Time 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Constant -1.01075 1.86116 -0.543 
Male -0.34491 0.1329 -2.595 
Caretaker’s household 0.04698 0.25344 0.185 
Low birth weight -0.25978 0.19807 -1.312 
Height of the child  7.10745 1.60757 4.421 
Household income (lagged) 0.12619 0.14492 0.871 
Mother’s education (log) 0.94564 0.14058 6.727 
Family business -0.31539 0.14678 -2.149 
Urban (averaged across time) -0.89463 0.25443 -3.516 
Population density (log, averaged) 0.22647 0.07583 2.987 
Price of kerosene (log, averaged) -0.60661 0.27147 -2.235 
Price of bananas (log, averaged) 0.56948 0.37626 1.514 
Price of corn (log, averaged) -0.76513 0.54104 -1.414 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.02249 0.01515 1.485 
Fraction of public schools in the area 2.039 1.29063 1.58 
f (unobserved ability) 0.2454 0.05047 4.863 
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Table 28. “Did individual i attend ELEMENTARY school during school  
year t?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Constant 8.38027 1.87944 4.459 
Missed school last year -3.58737 0.15046 -23.843 
Failed last grade -1.80821 0.15667 -11.542 
Completed schooling as of t -0.18207 0.05846 -3.114 
Age as of t -0.47338 0.04625 -10.234 
Male -0.25653 0.14007 -1.831 
Low birth weight -0.05034 0.16749 -0.301 
Caretaker’s household 0.18151 0.16722 1.085 
Mother’s education (log) 0.71608 0.1421 5.039 
Family business 0.20936 0.12272 1.706 
Household size -0.0653 0.02299 -2.841 
Household income (log) 0.18093 0.09633 1.878 
Urban 0.07424 0.22471 0.33 
Price of bananas -2.36825 1.32831 -1.783 
Price of corn 0.44235 0.24398 1.813 
Price of kerosene 0.00381 0.17782 0.021 
Population density (log) 0.0386 0.06519 0.592 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.00428 0.01104 -0.388 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.82912 1.31639 -0.63 
f (unobserved ability) 0.45686 0.06653 6.867 
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Table 29. “Did individual i attend HIGH school during school year t?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant 21.78741 1.70868 12.751 
First year of high school -1.70687 0.12841 -13.292 
Missed school last year -3.57008 0.11572 -30.85 
Failed last grade -2.82595 0.13407 -21.078 
Completed schooling as of t -1.24543 0.05865 -21.235 
Age as of t -0.47393 0.03689 -12.849 
Male -0.07221 0.08781 -0.822 
Low birth weight -0.07892 0.11958 -0.66 
Caretaker’s household 0.38258 0.11217 3.411 
Mother’s education (log) 0.53889 0.1051 5.127 
Family business 0.10599 0.08032 1.32 
Household size -0.02665 0.01415 -1.883 
Household income (log) 0.11983 0.05876 2.039 
Urban -0.04498 0.17808 -0.253 
Price of bananas 0.30584 0.82268 0.372 
Price of corn 0.05867 0.28379 0.207 
Price of kerosene -0.30697 0.14258 -2.153 
Population density (log) -0.07917 0.05662 -1.398 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.00554 0.00884 0.627 
Fraction of public schools in the area -1.82412 0.73907 -2.468 
Fraction of women with primary education -3.15619 1.15965 -2.722 
Fraction of women with more than primary -0.20294 0.63772 -0.318 
f (unobserved ability) 0.1663 0.0365 4.556 
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Table 30. “Did individual i attend COLLEGE during school year t?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant 16.17487 2.99355 5.403 
First year of college 0.87195 0.1995 4.371 
Missed school last year -2.9783 0.21613 -13.78 
Failed last grade -3.67108 0.24662 -14.885 
Completed schooling as of t -0.11558 0.08152 -1.418 
Age as of t -0.56391 0.07332 -7.692 
Male -0.2866 0.11669 -2.456 
Low birth weight -0.07053 0.18173 -0.388 
Caretaker’s household 0.43284 0.17899 2.418 
Mother’s education (log) 0.60936 0.15559 3.917 
Family business 0.17996 0.1206 1.492 
Household size -0.01511 0.02559 -0.591 
Household income (log) 0.02179 0.06421 0.339 
Urban 0.41393 0.23791 1.74 
Price of bananas -1.71997 1.66515 -1.033 
Price of corn -0.15955 0.62587 -0.255 
Price of kerosene -0.14834 0.31336 -0.473 
Population density (log) -0.15241 0.09576 -1.592 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.00641 0.01575 0.407 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.80286 1.06062 -0.757 
Fraction of women with primary education -3.29603 2.86844 -1.149 
Fraction of women with more than primary -1.01037 1.60393 -0.63 
f (unobserved ability) 0.14385 0.04983 2.887 
 
 
 
 71
  
Table 31. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school year 
t, ELEMENTARY school?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Constant -0.7936 1.65524 -0.479 
Missed school last year -1.12957 0.126 -8.965 
Failed last grade -0.38693 0.14264 -2.713 
Completed schooling as of t 0.06885 0.07369 0.934 
Age as of t 0.01385 0.04737 0.292 
Male -0.90979 0.11568 -7.865 
Low birth weight -0.27676 0.16686 -1.659 
Caretaker’s household 0.29133 0.16528 1.763 
Mother’s education (log) 1.18331 0.13961 8.476 
Family business 0.03849 0.10341 0.372 
Household size -0.07455 0.02206 -3.38 
Household income (log) 0.17682 0.08594 2.058 
Urban 0.29712 0.18624 1.595 
Price of bananas -1.64969 1.17803 -1.4 
Price of corn 0.44735 0.15358 2.913 
Price of kerosene -0.00429 0.07467 -0.057 
Population density (log) 0.01403 0.05851 0.24 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.01844 0.01216 -1.516 
Fraction of public schools in the area 1.98163 1.19014 1.665 
f (unobserved ability) 0.86525 0.07064 12.248 
 
 
 
 72
  
Table 32. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school year 
t, HIGH school?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant -3.19785 2.22097 -1.44 
First year of high school -0.16103 0.19692 -0.818 
Missed school last year -0.13214 0.19931 -0.663 
Failed last grade -0.88248 0.13079 -6.748 
Completed schooling as of t 0.22766 0.09382 2.427 
Age as of t -0.01746 0.05627 -0.31 
Male -1.10589 0.10775 -10.263 
Low birth weight 0.03099 0.14134 0.219 
Caretaker’s household 0.6105 0.13192 4.628 
Mother’s education (log) 0.67267 0.1236 5.442 
Family business 0.15454 0.09093 1.7 
Household size -0.0016 0.01855 -0.086 
Household income (log) -0.03331 0.06821 -0.488 
Urban -0.51226 0.20799 -2.463 
Price of bananas -0.52471 0.87984 -0.596 
Price of corn 0.17297 0.30086 0.575 
Price of kerosene -0.13479 0.15898 -0.848 
Population density (log) 0.04847 0.06911 0.701 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.00512 0.01183 0.432 
Fraction of public schools in the area 2.42789 0.92323 2.63 
Fraction of women with primary education 1.09003 1.57299 0.693 
Fraction of women with more than primary 0.77761 0.85866 0.906 
f (unobserved ability) 0.42181 0.04988 8.456 
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Table 33. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school year 
t, COLLEGE?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant -2.61024 3.51923 -0.742 
First year of college -0.04694 0.29425 -0.16 
Missed school last year -0.38392 0.29076 -1.32 
Failed last grade 0.43907 0.48787 0.9 
Completed schooling as of t 0.49942 0.16145 3.093 
Age as of t 0.04272 0.09711 0.44 
Male -0.29731 0.16116 -1.845 
Low birth weight -0.12738 0.28756 -0.443 
Caretaker’s household 0.54951 0.25761 2.133 
Mother’s education (log) 0.58487 0.21598 2.708 
Family business 0.15446 0.15992 0.966 
Household size 0.01762 0.03089 0.57 
Household income (log) -0.04249 0.09797 -0.434 
Urban 0.02373 0.34231 0.069 
Price of bananas -0.25002 2.20672 -0.113 
Price of corn -1.42072 0.67395 -2.108 
Price of kerosene -0.17336 0.34938 -0.496 
Population density (log) -0.09366 0.1298 -0.722 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.02524 0.02048 1.232 
Fraction of public schools in the area -1.62356 1.47843 -1.098 
Fraction of women with primary education 3.43858 3.43454 1.001 
Fraction of women with more than primary 1.76213 1.62844 1.082 
f (unobserved ability) 0.22384 0.06394 3.501 
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Table 34. Working for Pay During the Year t 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant -12.9635 1.09862 -11.8 
Age as of t 0.487 0.02165 22.497 
Male 0.16401 0.05491 2.987 
Low birth weight 0.15571 0.07887 1.974 
Mother’s education (log) -0.30736 0.0549 -5.598 
Family business -0.37279 0.05699 -6.542 
Household size 0.02246 0.00949 2.366 
Household income net of individual’s (log) -0.13686 0.02981 -4.591 
Urban -0.08089 0.10239 -0.79 
Price of bananas 2.30577 0.64855 3.555 
Price of corn 0.86752 0.19772 4.388 
Price of kerosene 0.3594 0.09383 3.83 
Population density (log) 0.04339 0.03846 1.128 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor as of t 0.00363 0.00418 0.868 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.005 0.00506 0.987 
Fraction of public schools in the area 2.05069 0.51353 3.993 
Fraction of women with primary education 0.01711 0.72687 0.024 
Fraction of women with more than primary 0.38545 0.36024 1.07 
f (unobserved ability) -0.01807 0.02019 -0.895 
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Table 35. Parameters Defining Probability Weights  
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
1θ  -0.35472 0.09634 -3.682 
2θ  0.30232 0.02838 10.654 
3θ  0.00018 0.00631 0.028 
 
 
 
 
Table 36. Implied Probabilities25  
 
Mass points Probabilities 
-3.75044 .0780248 
-2.366759 .208829 
-1.154405 .2923748 
0 .2470966 
1.154405 .1289738 
2.366759 .0391427 
3.75044 .0055584 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Mass points and corresponding probabilities from the table imply the mean of the distribution to be equal to    
-0.86 and the variance 2.38. 
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Table 37. Mincer-type Log Wage Regression (as of the 2005 survey) 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Male 
 
.2470 
 
.0420 
 
5.88 
Experience 
 
-.0427 
 
.0106 
 
-2.45 
Completed schooling 
 
.0427 
 
.0143 
 
4.01 
Constant 
 
2.5989 
 
.1536 
 
16.92 
  
N= 1215, εσ = 0.68, 2R = 0.07 
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APPENDIX D: Estimates, specification includes data from the 
2005 survey, CDE specification 
 
 
Table 38. Math Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 2.18445 0.23148 9.437 
Age as of test date 2.09395 0.47389 4.419 
Male -2.66783 0.37531 -7.108 
Low birth weight -0.84493 0.57965 -1.458 
Caretaker’s household 0.97861 0.61476 1.592 
Mother’s education (log) 4.7781 0.45787 10.435 
Family business 0.52985 0.34799 1.523 
Household size -0.11214 0.07371 -1.521 
Household income (log) 0.20748 0.24831 0.836 
Urban 3.33722 0.723 4.616 
Price of bananas -17.109 8.66475 -1.975 
Price of corn -0.84108 1.08883 -0.772 
Price of kerosene 3.3216 1.75877 1.889 
Population density (log) -1.12482 0.22967 -4.898 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.01261 0.04296 -0.294 
Fraction of public schools in the area -3.66975 3.80116 -0.965 
Constant -7.07441 10.15863 -0.696 
    
f (unobserved ability) 3.54512 0.43349 8.178 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.84796 0.04898 17.311 
f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 0.39619 0.09541 4.153 
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Table 39. English Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 0.95941 0.20427 4.697 
Age as of test date 2.49932 0.43988 5.682 
Male -3.41452 0.35982 -9.49 
Low birth weight  -0.65376 0.54637 -1.197 
Caretaker’s household 0.7899 0.62201 1.27 
Mother’s education (log) 5.73284 0.44615 12.85 
Family business -0.5395 0.33319 -1.619 
Household size -0.21286 0.06895 -3.087 
Household income (log) 0.78481 0.24597 3.191 
Urban 2.62567 0.7223 3.635 
Price of bananas -0.60473 8.40629 -0.072 
Price of corn -0.84046 0.98902 -0.85 
Price of kerosene 5.64818 1.72862 3.267 
Population density (log) -0.70414 0.2216 -3.178 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.04813 0.04467 -1.078 
Fraction of public schools in the area -4.38272 3.77675 -1.16 
Constant -23.1019 9.07288 -2.546 
    
 f (unobserved ability) 3.08587 0.38221 8.074 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.94404 0.04677 20.186 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) 0.49648 0.08095 6.133 
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Table 40. IQ Test Scores 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Completed schooling as of test date 1.04677 0.24173 4.33 
Age as of test date -3.35711 0.54275 -6.185 
Male -0.27795 0.2579 -1.078 
Low birth weight  0.02195 0.39632 0.055 
Caretaker’s household 0.42202 0.50784 0.831 
Mother’s education (log) 2.39864 0.29923 8.016 
Family business -0.17237 0.2707 -0.637 
Household size -0.23761 0.0575 -4.132 
Household income (log) 0.81328 0.26772 3.038 
Urban -0.01154 0.46035 -0.025 
Price of bananas -5.21439 3.17807 -1.641 
Price of corn 0.04846 0.42844 0.113 
Price of kerosene 0.15633 0.17541 0.891 
Population density (log) 0.25546 0.14212 1.797 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.00306 0.02873 -0.106 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.42015 2.61866 -0.16 
Constant 51.32728 6.24039 8.225 
    
 f (unobserved ability) 2.58942 0.1925 13.452 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) -0.11728 0.0359 -3.266 
 f*S (schooling-ability interaction) -0.43525 0.11551 -3.768 
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Table 41. Entered School on Time 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Constant -1.21481 1.87979 -0.646 
Male -0.3157 0.13369 -2.361 
Caretaker’s household 0.02835 0.25076 0.113 
Low birth weight -0.223 0.20034 -1.113 
Height of the child  6.94476 1.62058 4.285 
Household income (lagged) 0.14233 0.14586 0.976 
Mother’s education (log) 0.91609 0.13906 6.588 
Family business -0.33051 0.14837 -2.228 
Urban (averaged across time) -0.93739 0.25638 -3.656 
Population density (log, averaged) 0.22814 0.07599 3.002 
Price of kerosene (log, averaged) -0.60164 0.27028 -2.226 
Price of bananas (log, averaged) 0.61432 0.38251 1.606 
Price of corn (log, averaged) -0.70429 0.54763 -1.286 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.02153 0.01535 1.403 
Fraction of public schools in the area 1.84718 1.30316 1.417 
f (unobserved ability) 0.25097 0.05186 4.84 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.01192 0.01769 0.674 
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Table 42. “Did individual i attend ELEMENTARY school during school year 
t?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Constant 7.68035 1.87807 4.089 
Missed school last year -3.53563 0.14985 -23.594 
Failed last grade -1.80972 0.15458 -11.707 
Completed schooling as of t -0.11741 0.05427 -2.164 
Age as of t -0.51332 0.04473 -11.476 
Male -0.19306 0.13634 -1.416 
Low birth weight -0.09268 0.15952 -0.581 
Caretaker’s household 0.17632 0.16792 1.05 
Mother’s education (log) 0.65989 0.13875 4.756 
Family business 0.20726 0.12813 1.618 
Household size -0.05843 0.02311 -2.529 
Household income (log) 0.17752 0.09824 1.807 
Urban 0.06841 0.22576 0.303 
Price of bananas -2.1659 1.31224 -1.651 
Price of corn 0.3741 0.24353 1.536 
Price of kerosene 0.04228 0.17888 0.236 
Population density (log) 0.02923 0.06459 0.453 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.00117 0.01053 -0.111 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.82312 1.32523 -0.621 
f (unobserved ability) 0.48975 0.07484 6.544 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.10949 0.01788 6.125 
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Table 43. “Did individual i attend HIGH school during school year t?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant 21.59043 1.7124 12.608 
First year of high school -1.70289 0.12968 -13.132 
Missed school last year -3.55274 0.11683 -30.408 
Failed last grade -2.82234 0.13457 -20.972 
Completed schooling as of t -1.23714 0.05947 -20.804 
Age as of t -0.48219 0.03711 -12.995 
Male -0.05105 0.08748 -0.584 
Low birth weight -0.09267 0.12105 -0.766 
Caretaker’s household 0.37442 0.11179 3.349 
Mother’s education (log) 0.53206 0.10418 5.107 
Family business 0.10782 0.08164 1.321 
Household size -0.02548 0.01432 -1.78 
Household income (log) 0.12031 0.05923 2.031 
Urban -0.03954 0.1788 -0.221 
Price of bananas 0.32103 0.82906 0.387 
Price of corn 0.04668 0.28374 0.165 
Price of kerosene -0.30486 0.14373 -2.121 
Population density (log) -0.09057 0.05664 -1.599 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.00618 0.00885 0.698 
Fraction of public schools in the area -1.87239 0.74877 -2.501 
Fraction of women with primary education -3.14761 1.16871 -2.693 
Fraction of women with more than primary -0.16434 0.64292 -0.256 
f (unobserved ability) 0.1666 0.03788 4.398 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.04594 0.01034 4.444 
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Table 44. “Did individual i attend COLLEGE during school year t?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant 15.98374 3.02216 5.289 
First year of college 0.86905 0.20045 4.335 
Missed school last year -2.97816 0.21759 -13.687 
Failed last grade -3.67068 0.24856 -14.767 
Completed schooling as of t -0.11849 0.08208 -1.444 
Age as of t -0.5628 0.07381 -7.625 
Male -0.27987 0.11779 -2.376 
Low birth weight -0.06653 0.18433 -0.361 
Caretaker’s household 0.43498 0.17934 2.426 
Mother’s education (log) 0.60955 0.15498 3.933 
Family business 0.18178 0.12065 1.507 
Household size -0.01315 0.02572 -0.511 
Household income (log) 0.0193 0.06466 0.298 
Urban 0.41663 0.23887 1.744 
Price of bananas -1.75116 1.688 -1.037 
Price of corn -0.18646 0.63088 -0.296 
Price of kerosene -0.14512 0.31458 -0.461 
Population density (log) -0.15236 0.09598 -1.587 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.00648 0.01594 0.407 
Fraction of public schools in the area -0.83433 1.07404 -0.777 
Fraction of women with primary education -3.27376 2.87981 -1.137 
Fraction of women with more than primary -1.02833 1.60915 -0.639 
f (unobserved ability) 0.14503 0.06291 2.305 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.02753 0.0223 1.234 
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Table 45. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school year 
t, ELEMENTARY school?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
Constant -1.86058 1.57492 -1.181 
Missed school last year -1.09271 0.12443 -8.782 
Failed last grade -0.42614 0.14382 -2.963 
Completed schooling as of t 0.15197 0.0703 2.162 
Age as of t -0.0413 0.04492 -0.919 
Male -0.79952 0.10442 -7.657 
Low birth weight -0.28231 0.13963 -2.022 
Caretaker’s household 0.28004 0.15784 1.774 
Mother’s education (log) 1.08552 0.13022 8.336 
Family business 0.01483 0.10076 0.147 
Household size -0.05894 0.02077 -2.838 
Household income (log) 0.17692 0.08269 2.139 
Urban 0.25445 0.17443 1.459 
Price of bananas -1.21895 1.16904 -1.043 
Price of corn 0.42342 0.15165 2.792 
Price of kerosene 0.00177 0.07246 0.024 
Population density (log) 0.00133 0.05526 0.024 
Local pupil-teacher ratio -0.01559 0.01036 -1.504 
Fraction of public schools in the area 1.60639 1.07619 1.493 
f (unobserved ability) 0.93614 0.07092 13.199 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.17121 0.01645 10.407 
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Table 46. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school year 
t, HIGH school?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant -3.61291 2.18769 -1.651 
First year of high school -0.16519 0.19705 -0.838 
Missed school last year -0.12059 0.19963 -0.604 
Failed last grade -0.8744 0.1311 -6.67 
Completed schooling as of t 0.24503 0.0939 2.61 
Age as of t -0.03648 0.05609 -0.65 
Male -1.05239 0.10341 -10.177 
Low birth weight 0.02646 0.13639 0.194 
Caretaker’s household 0.58061 0.13095 4.434 
Mother’s education (log) 0.64446 0.11917 5.408 
Family business 0.15389 0.09085 1.694 
Household size 0.00176 0.01818 0.097 
Household income (log) -0.0295 0.06828 -0.432 
Urban -0.49527 0.20835 -2.377 
Price of bananas -0.4992 0.87919 -0.568 
Price of corn 0.13826 0.30003 0.461 
Price of kerosene -0.13272 0.1584 -0.838 
Population density (log) 0.04021 0.0685 0.587 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.00538 0.01156 0.466 
Fraction of public schools in the area 2.35878 0.88578 2.663 
Fraction of women with primary education 1.03575 1.56597 0.661 
Fraction of women with more than primary 0.69609 0.85193 0.817 
f (unobserved ability) 0.42225 0.04379 9.643 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.08204 0.0142 5.778 
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Table 47. “Did individual i successfully complete the grade during school year 
t, COLLEGE?” 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant -2.97235 3.52024 -0.844 
First year of college -0.04542 0.2938 -0.155 
Missed school last year -0.39659 0.29092 -1.363 
Failed last grade 0.43508 0.49643 0.876 
Completed schooling as of t 0.49482 0.16227 3.049 
Age as of t 0.04648 0.09792 0.475 
Male -0.28147 0.16201 -1.737 
Low birth weight -0.11729 0.29024 -0.404 
Caretaker’s household 0.55147 0.25912 2.128 
Mother’s education (log) 0.58362 0.21606 2.701 
Family business 0.1537 0.16231 0.947 
Household size 0.01949 0.0311 0.627 
Household income (log) -0.0421 0.09864 -0.427 
Urban 0.02684 0.33972 0.079 
Price of bananas -0.2957 2.19673 -0.135 
Price of corn -1.44783 0.6756 -2.143 
Price of kerosene -0.1635 0.34981 -0.467 
Population density (log) -0.09298 0.1294 -0.719 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.02577 0.02059 1.252 
Fraction of public schools in the area -1.68854 1.47477 -1.145 
Fraction of women with primary education 3.47217 3.44168 1.009 
Fraction of women with more than primary 1.72758 1.63553 1.056 
f (unobserved ability) 0.2332 0.06713 3.474 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) 0.02877 0.0224 1.284 
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Table 48. Working for Pay During the Year t 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic
Constant -12.4765 1.1007 -11.335 
Age as of t 0.462 0.02171 21.278 
Male 0.14566 0.0542 2.688 
Low birth weight 0.1338 0.07703 1.737 
Mother’s education (log) -0.30423 0.05472 -5.56 
Family business -0.32502 0.05658 -5.745 
Household size 0.03156 0.00942 3.349 
Household income net of individual’s (log) -0.14769 0.03069 -4.813 
Urban -0.08521 0.10324 -0.825 
Price of bananas 2.24186 0.64472 3.477 
Price of corn 0.81286 0.19745 4.117 
Price of kerosene 0.36202 0.09129 3.966 
Population density (log) 0.04928 0.0381 1.294 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor as of t -0.0007 0.00413 -0.17 
Local pupil-teacher ratio 0.00617 0.00505 1.222 
Fraction of public schools in the area 2.24148 0.50257 4.46 
Fraction of women with primary education -0.20235 0.71978 -0.281 
Fraction of women with more than primary 0.32889 0.37021 0.888 
f (unobserved ability) -0.03106 0.02159 -1.439 
f^2 (unobserved ability squared) -0.02139 0.00691 -3.096 
 
 
 
 
 
 88
  
Table 49. Log of Hourly Wage Rate, CDE specification. Reporting average 
marginal effects for all regressors except for the unobserved ability terms. 
 
Variable Av. Marginal Effect Std. error 
Male 0.0847 0.021426
Age 0.1053 0.0468 
Experience -0.0206 0.0077 
Completed schooling 0.0293 0.0073 
Urban -0.0467 – 
Population density (log) 0.0314 – 
Local wage rate for unskilled labor -0.0003 – 
  
 
 
                                                 
26 The standard errors are estimated via parametric bootstrap with 50 iterations.  
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Table 50. Parameters Defining Probability Weights 
 
Variable Estimate Standard error t-statistic 
1θ  0.7629 0.07848 9.72 
2θ  0.2645 0.01466 18.038 
3θ  -0.0591 0.00574 -10.292 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 51. Implied Probabilities27  
 
Mass points Probabilities 
-5.188001 .0385228 
-3.936167 .0112604 
-2.865123 .0139281 
-1.876035 .0310303 
-.928869 .0822841 
0 .1934869 
.928869 .3088073 
1.876035 .2488818 
2.865123 .0684083 
3.936167 .0033828 
5.188001 7.17e-06 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Mass points and corresponding probabilities imply the mean of the distribution to be equal to 0.54 and the 
variance 2.97. 
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